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N.K. Jaynes 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The concept of ―restorative justice‖ has in recent years been widely invoked in the 
transitional justice literature. The term is however often used loosely, inconsistently and 
in apparently different senses. This minor dissertation addresses this dilemma by bringing 
together three influential bodies of work on restorative justice and exploring what each 
body of work means by the term ―restorative justice‖. The three bodies of work are that 
of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, criminal justice theorists and accounts of African 
Traditional Justice Mechanisms.  With a clearer picture of what these respective sources 
mean when referring to restorative justice, the discussion then turns to the potential 
relevance and significance of these conceptions of restorative justice for transitional 
justice.  
 
The three bodies of work on restorative justice, while distinct in their own right, are 
brought into conversation through applying a uniform methodology. This methodology 
draws on John Rawls‘ distinction between concept and conception. Given that restorative 
justice is not concerned with the rules of ordinary language usage a conceptual analysis is 
not possible. What is possible is to follow a route of enquiry that explores the different 
conceptions of restorative justice reflected in each body of work. These conceptions are 
discussed against the backdrop of a transitional justice framework.  
 
This minor dissertation does not make any claims regarding the concept of restorative 
justice. Rather what are delivered are some findings about the conceptions of restorative 
justice that feature within the three bodies of work under discussion. The conceptions of 
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restorative justice differ in certain respects but also overlap in others. The crucial point of 
overlap concerns a sociological or relational approach to crime and wrongdoing which 
requires that all parties to a conflict are involved in its resolution. Herein lies the chief 
contribution of restorative justice to transitional justice, namely that restorative justice 
embodies what Jon Elster deems to be the task of transitional justice – that a society 
judge itself.  
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Introduction 
 
 
―For all men cling to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they 
do not express the whole idea‖ 
Aristotle
1
 
 
 
 
This study seeks to clarify the concept of ―restorative justice‖ by exploring what is meant 
by the term ―restorative justice‖. The motivation for this study is well articulated in the 
following comment made by Declan Roche: ―While support for restorative justice may be 
easy to find, its meaning remains much more elusive. ‗ Restorative justice‘ is used to 
describe a bewilderingly diverse range of practices and programmes‖.2 Although 
―restorative justice‖ is widely invoked in the transitional justice literature, the term is 
often used loosely, inconsistently and in apparently different senses. The task of this 
minor dissertation is two-fold. Firstly  to try and gain a clearer picture of restorative 
justice by exploring three influential sources of thinking on restorative justice, namely 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, criminal justice theorists and accounts of African Traditional 
Justice mechanisms. And then secondly, to assess the relevance and significance of 
restorative justice for transitional justice. 
 
Within the field of transitional justice, the notion of ―restorative justice‖ emerged 
prominently within the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). Generally, the term ―restorative justice‖ is used in the transitional 
justice literature to refer to non-adversarial approaches that favour victim-oriented truth 
commissions over prosecutions of perpetrators.
3
 The so-called restorative character of the 
TRC is explained by the decision to offer conditional amnesty and forgo a retributive 
approach towards perpetrators while at the same time provide fora for victim-centred 
                                                 
1
 Aristotle, Politics, Book III Chapter 9, 1280. 
2
 Roche, Declan ―Restorative Justice and the Regulatory State in South African Townships‖ British Journal 
of Criminology 42 (2002):516.  
3
 See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass 
Violence. (Boston: Beacon Books, 1998).  
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reconciliation.
4
 Within this context, restorative justice became popularised and bold 
claims were made suggesting that restorative justice was crucial for the TRC process and 
for transitional justice in general.
5
 Archbishop Desmond Tutu as chairperson of the TRC 
is well known for his support of restorative justice. Similarly, the Research Director for 
the TRC Charles Villa-Vicencio asserts that the South African TRC and other truth 
commissions are ―essentially instruments of restorative justice‖.6   
 
The TRC process also led to an increase in the popularity of restorative justice amongst 
transitional justice scholars not directly involved in the TRC process.  Following the TRC 
restorative justice, although a disputed concept, gained recognition amongst transitional 
justice scholars. International human rights law professor Miriam Aukerman notes, 
―Whatever words we use to describe it, the concept of restorative justice is certainly 
relevant to transitional justice‖.7 Bronwyn Leebaw writes after the TRC and suggests that 
the TRC experience ―demonstrates the potential contributions of restorative justice 
principles to addressing the dilemmas of transitional justice‖.8 The overwhelming 
majority of literature that deals with the intersections between restorative justice and 
transitional justice was published during the period 1998-2000, the period following the 
TRC‘s victims‘ hearings.9  
 
However, arguments for the centrality of restorative justice are not without their counter 
responses. Within the context of the TRC many differ with Tutu and the like and 
emphasise the vague and ambiguous nature of restorative justice. Stuart Wilson criticises 
                                                 
4
 TRC Report, Vol 1, Par 55a, 117.  
5
 Lyn Graybill & Kimberly Lanegran, ―Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa,‖ African Studies 
Quarterly Vol 8, Issue 1, 2004:5.  
6
 Charles Villa-Vicencio, ―Restorative Justice: dealing with the past differently,‖ in Looking Back Reaching 
Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. Charles Villa-
Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: Juta and UCT Press, 2000), 68.  
7
 Miriam J. Aukerman, ―A framework for understanding transitional justice,‖ Harvard Human Rights 
Journal volume 15, 2002:81.  
8
 Bronwyn Leebaw, ―Restorative Justice for Political Transitions‖ Contemporary Justice Review 43 Vol. 4 
(2001):269.  
9
 Martha Minow is perhaps one of the more prominent scholars in this regard. Minow looks at possible 
alternatives to prosecutions and discusses the TRC when surveying the potential therapeutic effects of truth 
commissions. While her use of the term ‗restorative justice‘ is minimal, her discussion on the healing 
effects of truth commissions and reparations remains a key text for advocates of restorative justice in 
transitional justice contexts. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness – Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). See Chapters 4 and 5 for these discussions. 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
8 
 
the manner in which restorative justice has been used as a justification for the South 
African amnesty clause.
10
  He explores the concepts of retribution, forgiveness and mercy 
with a view to ―expos[ing] the crumbling foundations of the TRC‘s brand of restorative 
justice‖.11 Similarly Jonathan Allen discusses some of the problems associated with using 
‗restorative justice‘ as a model to redress human rights violations.12  Allen acknowledges 
the shortcomings of an adversarial approach to criminal justice but ultimately finds that 
the truth commission model cannot be seen as a substitute for punitive justice but rather 
as a complement.  
 
It is also the case that certain authoritative accounts of transitional justice place marginal 
significance on the role of restorative justice. Jon Elster‘s edited collection of analyses of 
transitional justice from 1945 – 2006 does not make any reference to restorative justice 
other than a few remarks in Alex Boraine‘s chapter on the South African TRC.13 
Similarly other influential transitional justice scholars like Carlos Nino and Areyh Neier 
do not include restorative justice as a central element of transitional justice.
14
  
 
Thus there is a clear divergence in the literature between 1) those who claim crucial 
significance for restorative justice both in terms of the TRC and transitional justice in 
general and 2) those who either disregard the significance of restorative justice for 
transitional justice or highlight its ambiguity. This study aims to interrogate this 
divergence along the following lines.       
 
                                                 
10
 Stuart Wilson, ―The Myth of Restorative Justice: Truth, Reconciliation and the Ethics of Amnesty,‖ 
South African Journal of Human Rights 17 (2001):531-561.  
11
 Ibid., 535.  
12
 Jonathan Allen, ―Memory and Politics: Three Theories of Justice in Regime Transitions,‖ unpublished 
paper presented at the Transnational Seminar Series, University of Illinois. Available online at -  
www.cgs.uiuc.edu/resources/conf_seminars_workshops/TPSAllen.pdf. Allen develops his argument more 
clearly in ―Between Retribution and Restoration: Justice and the TRC‖, South African Journal of 
Philosophy 20/1 (2001): 22-46.     
13
 Jon Elster, ed. Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
14
 Carlos Nino, ―The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of 
Argentina‖, Yale Law Journal 1991; Carlos Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (Yale University Press, 1996) 
Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for Justice (New York: Times 
Books, Random House, 1998).  
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The claim that restorative justice was central to the TRC process and transitional justice 
in general is problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the available literature does not 
offer sufficient consensus on what ―restorative justice‖ actually means. Secondly, it is far 
from clear what the relevance and significance of restorative justice is for transitional 
justice. Due to the lack of clarity regarding the meaning of restorative justice, it is 
necessary to extend our investigation into restorative justice beyond the context of the 
TRC and explore other influential sources of restorative justice.  
 
This thesis commences by setting the scene in terms of developing a transitional justice 
framework in Chapter 1. The term ‗transitional justice‘ broadly refers to ―the 
conception[s] of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes‖.15 
Furthermore, these periods of political change are characterised by a move from violent 
conflict to ―peace, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective 
rights‖.16 Such transition involves reckoning with the legacy of human rights violations 
committed by the previous regime and its opponents.
17
 Within the realm of transitional 
justice there are a variety of approaches that can assist with confronting past abuses. 
These approaches can be judicial or non-judicial ranging from prosecutions, truth telling 
commissions, reparations to victims of gross human rights violations, institutional reform 
by lustration to reconciliation initiatives and various other forms of responses. The 
transitional justice literature broadly categorises these approaches into two senses of 
justice: retributive and restorative. While the notion of retributive justice enjoys 
substantial consensus and is relatively well understood, the same cannot be said of 
‗restorative justice‘, which is often used in different and perhaps incompatible senses. 
Chapter 1 will offer a canvas against which various conceptions of restorative justice will 
                                                 
15
 Ruti G. Teitel, ―Transitional Justice Genealogy‖ Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003):1 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss16/teitel.shtml. Teitel follows O‘Donnell & Schmitter, in 
their definition of a transition as the interval between one political regime and another. Guillermo 
O‘Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies 6 (1998).  
16
 Louis Bickford, ―Transitional Justice,‖ Macmillan Encyclopaedia of Genocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity, as cited at http://ictj.org/en/tj   
17
 David A. Crocker, ―Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,‖ in Robert I. Rotberg 
and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000) 99-121.  
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be viewed so as to draw conclusions regarding the relevance and significance of 
restorative justice for transitional justice.  
 
Chapter 2 then explores Archbishop Desmond Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice. 
Within the field of transitional justice, Archbishop Desmond Tutu is widely 
acknowledged as an advocate of restorative justice, predominantly through his role as the 
chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This 
study will explore what Tutu means when he speaks about restorative justice and whether 
his conception of restorative justice has any relevance and significance for the field of 
transitional justice.  
 
Chapter 3 explores conceptions of restorative justice as developed within the field of 
criminal justice. Notions of restorative justice have enjoyed significant appeal within the 
context of criminal justice and represent an important source in any enquiry into 
restorative justice. While criminal justice is a specialised field in its own right and clearly 
differs from that of transitional justice, this study suggests that it is possible to apply 
insights from field to the other.
18
 As Alex Boraine notes; 
 ―transitional justice is not a contradiction of criminal justice, but rather a deeper, 
richer and broader vision of justice which seeks to confront perpetrators, address 
the needs of victims, and start a process of reconciliation and transformation 
toward a more just and humane society‖.19     
 
Chapter 4 explores African Traditional Justice Mechanisms and how these mechanisms 
are described in the literature as restorative. Within the sub-Saharan African context 
special use has been made of customary or traditional justice approaches and practices to 
supplement or even replace criminal justice procedures as mechanisms for dealing with 
the aftermath of mass atrocity. These customary or traditional approaches prioritise the 
well-being of the community over punishing the perpetrator and are hence broadly 
classed as restorative. In this regard we will focus on the Mato Oput ceremonies practised 
                                                 
18
 Kieran McEvoy proposes that transitional justice stands to gain from borrowing insights from criminal 
justice and criminology. See McEvoy, ―Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a ‗Thicker‘ Version of 
Transitional Justice‖ in Transitional Justice from Below, Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 15-45.   
19
 Alex Boriane, ―Transitional Justice‖, in Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader, eds., Pieces of the 
Puzzle – Keywords on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice (Cape Town: IJR, 2004), 67.  
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by the Acholi tribes in Northern Uganda and the Gacaca Tribunals in post-genocide 
Rwanda. We explore these African Traditional Justice Mechanisms in terms of how they 
are explained as restorative in the literature, and then based on these accounts make some 
conclusions regarding their overall relevance and significance to transitional justice.  
 
The task of this thesis is to try and gain a clearer picture of the above-mentioned three 
influential sources of thinking on restorative justice and then to plot the potential 
relevance and significance of these conceptions of restorative justice for the context of 
transitional justice. The notion of bringing these three distinct repositories of work on 
restorative justice together represents a novel offering. While each of the three sources 
under discussion are quite distinct in their own right, they are brought into conversation 
through a uniform methodology.  
 
This methodology draws on the distinction between concept and conception.
20
 Briefly, 
concepts are concerned with the rules of ordinary language usage, the general criteria by 
which ordinary usage of words are determined. It follows that concepts are general and 
intersubjective within a particular language community. While concepts are concerned 
with ordinary language usage, conceptions pertain to certain individuals and groups and 
are therefore variable. The method of conceptual analysis is not well suited to the concept 
of restorative justice because methods of conceptual analysis are premised on the notion 
of concepts as concerned with the rules of ordinary language usage. It therefore follows 
that a concept like ‗restorative justice‘, which is not part of ordinary language, is not well 
suited to conceptual analysis. A better route of inquiry is to explore different conceptions 
of restorative justice. It is possible to enquire into different people‘s conceptions of 
restorative justice. An investigation of different conceptions of restorative justice will 
involve factual questions about the views and associations held by particular individuals 
or groups.  
 
                                                 
20
 This distinction is used authoritatively by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 
1971). This study draws on John Wilson‘s development of this distinction in his Thinking with Concepts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 
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We are therefore not making a claim to uncover the concept of restorative justice, or 
justice for that matter. But rather to make some findings regarding the conceptions of 
restorative justice at play in three influential sources of thinking on the topic – 
Archbishop Tutu‘s work, criminal justice theorists and African Traditional Justice 
Mechanisms. Based on these findings certain comments will then be made regarding the 
relevance and significance of restorative justice for contexts of transitional justice.  
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Chapter One 
 A Transitional Justice Framework 
 
 
As noted in the Introduction the task of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly  to try and gain a 
clearer picture of restorative justice by exploring three influential sources of thinking on 
restorative justice, namely Archbishop Desmond Tutu, criminal justice theorists and 
accounts of African Traditional Justice mechanisms. Secondly, to assess the relevance 
and significance of restorative justice for transitional justice. It is therefore with a view to 
the overall project of this thesis that this chapter develops a framing account of 
transitional justice to serve as a scene-setting precursor to the discussion of three different 
approaches to restorative justice and their significance for transitional justice.  
 
Section one of this chapter addresses the nature of transitional justice by considering 
some accounts in the literature that delineate transitional justice as a distinct field of 
study. These accounts discuss transitional justice as a distinct field of study in terms of 
distinctive themes and issues, emergent principles and as a normative conceptual 
framework.  
 
Section two of this chapter discusses four watershed moments within the genealogy of 
the field of transitional justice; the Nuremberg Trials, the Latin American truth processes 
of Argentina and Chile, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the 
establishment of international justice mechanisms leading up to the advent of the 
International Criminal Court. These four watershed moments have been deliberately 
selected due to their impact on how justice is understood within the field of transitional 
justice. The discussion of these four watershed moments will necessarily be selective in 
focussing on those developments that have a bearing on the notion of restorative justice.  
 
The chapter concludes with a summation of key points from sections one and two thereby 
comprising the parameters of the transitional justice framework that applies to the rest of 
this study.   
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1.1 The Nature of Transitional Justice 
 
In order to develop a framing account of transitional justice it is necessary to unpack 
transitional justice as a distinctive field of study. The question is about the ways in which 
the relevant research and literature has developed either as part of the domain of a 
particular discipline and closely associated with certain institutions, or as an 
interdisciplinary inquiry organised thematically in a holistic perspective. It is these 
questions that this section attempts to investigate.  
 
 
1.1.1 Transitional Justice as a Distinctive Sub-field of Study 
 
 
The question of whether transitional justice constitutes a distinctive sub-field of study is 
about whether the different positions taken on the question of dealing with the past and/or 
the different accountability mechanisms which have been developed and/or the typical 
constraints and dilemmas characterising transitional justice amount to a distinct "field of 
study". It could be that these various topics and issues do not belong together, or that they 
are part of other established fields of study (e.g. of criminal justice, international human 
rights law, the study of democratic transitions or of social and moral philosophy). 
 
Even if we are to follow the lines of Elster
21
 and Bass
22
 and assume that the phenomenon 
of transitional justice has existed since the 4
th
 century, research and literature dealing 
specifically with transitional justice is a fairly recent development. While transitional 
justice issues have long featured in various bodies of literature, these accounts have 
formed part of the general literature on criminal justice or human rights law and hence do 
not point to transitional justice as a distinct field of study.  
 
                                                 
21
 See Jon Elster 1998. ―Coming to terms with the past.‖ Archives Europienne Sociologique, vol.39:7-48. 
Elster suggests that the phenomenon of transitional justice recurs throughout history and could be traced 
back to Athenian democracy in the 4th century BC after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants in 403 BC.  
22
 See Gary Bass, 2000. Stay the Hand of Vengeance. Bass discusses earlier historical episodes including 
the exile of Napoleon as well as post-World War I developments.  
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Transitional justice as a distinct field of study will imply that research and literature on 
transitional justice have become separated out and therefore constituted as a distinct field 
of study, which is no longer subsumed under other traditional rubrics but has acquired its 
own significance and identity. We do begin to find accounts of the various issues and 
aspects of transitional justice as a distinctive and recognisable phenomenon in the late 
1980s following the so-called ―third wave‖ of democratisation.23 There is a recognisable 
body of literature that offers accounts of ―dealing with the past‖ in the context of 
transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. 
24
 However, these accounts mostly take 
the form of thematic surveys and cannot be deemed comprehensive accounts of 
transitional justice as a field.   
 
A more comprehensive investigation into transitional justice can be found in the literature 
that emanated from the series of conferences organised by the Aspen Institute at the end 
of the 1980s.
25
 These conferences were organised under the Institute‘s ―Justice in 
Transition‖ project. Richard Lewis-Siegel suggests that these conference proceedings are 
representative of a significant trend in the literature that designates transitional justice as 
distinctly concerned with ―a set of issues facing countries whose previous regimes carried 
out widespread crimes against their own people in the interest of maintaining power and 
ideological control‖.26 The conference proceedings also reflect a clear delineation of a set 
of debates that fall beyond thematic surveys or existing debates in other fields rather what 
is found is the emergence of a new set of issues.  
 
                                                 
23
 Samuel Huntington explores the plethora of democratic transitions  mostly in Latin America in his book 
The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (1991).   
24
 See for example Luc Huyse 1995 ―Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in 
Dealing with the Past‖, Law and Social Inquiry 1995, Vol. 20( 1) Winter; Jamie Malamud-Goti, 
Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals? 12 Human Rights Quarterly 1 
(1990); Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism (New York: 
Random House, 1995); Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1990); Timothy Garton Ash, The File: A Personal History (New York: Random 
House, 1997).  
25
 See for example, ―State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon‖, Papers and Reports of the Conference Nov 4-6 
1988, The Justice and Society Program of the Aspen Institute, 1989.  
26
 Richard Lewis-Siegel, ―Transitional Justice: A Decade of Debate and Experience‖, Human Rights 
Quarterly 20 (1998):435.   
Un
ive
rsi
ty
Of
 C
ap
 To
wn
 
16 
 
Paige Arthur uses the 1988 Aspen Conference as her point of departure in developing a 
―Conceptual History of Transitional Justice‖.27 She goes into extensive detail in analysing 
the conference themes and input and finds that the conference reflects a certain 
conception of justice. This conception of justice is premised on ―two normative aims: 
achieving justice for victims, and achieving a more just, democratic order‖.28 Arthur 
develops this line of thought and ultimately finds that it is this second normative aim of 
―facilitating a transition to democracy‖ that makes the field of transitional justice 
distinctive‖ from other human rights concerns.29   We shall return to Arthur‘s assertion in 
due course.  
 
The three-volume work edited by Neil J. Kritz is in many ways an extension and 
development of the Aspen conference deliberations. Kritz‘s volumes remain perhaps the 
most comprehensive collection that deals specifically with transitional justice.
30
 Volume I 
explores what Kritz calls ―General Considerations‖ ranging from issues around 
accountability and moral responsibility to treatment of victims. Volume II is dedicated to 
―Country Studies‖ with experiences from thirty five countries examined. Volume III is 
focussed on ―Laws, rulings and reports‖ with a sample of key founding documents and 
primary texts. With a foreword by then President Nelson Mandela the Kritz collection 
represents a key step in the development of transitional justice as a distinct field of study.  
 
Another significant development has been the formation of various non-governmental 
organisations aimed specifically at dealing with transitional justice issues. In 2001 the 
International Center for Transitional Justice was formally established ―on the concept of a 
new direction in human rights advocacy: helping societies to heal by accounting for and 
addressing past crimes after a period of repressive rule or armed conflict‖.31 In 2007 a 
specialised journal on transitional justice was launched as a way of promoting scholarship 
                                                 
27
 See Arthur,  ―How ‗Transitions‘ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice‖ 
Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009).  
28
 Arthur 2009:357.  
29
 Arthur 2009:358.  
30
 Neil J. Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 3 
Vols. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).  
31
 As cited on the ICTJ website ―Mission and History‖, http://www.ictj.org/en/about/mission/.  
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from the global South on transitional justice issues.
32
 Domestically, an important 
development is the inclusion of transitional justice as a recognised research area by the 
South African National Research Foundation.  
 
These and other developments have coincided with a sizable growth in literature dealing 
with transitional justice issues. This literature delineates and characterises transitional 
justice as a distinct field of study in terms of a particular set of themes & issues; in terms 
of a certain normative and conceptual framework; a set of emergent principles and also in 
relation to established fields (e.g. criminal justice / international law) from which it 
diverges and overlaps.  
Kritz‘ work is probably one of the clearest examples of the approach that examines 
transitional justice in terms of themes and issues. This three volume collection includes 
contributions from a wide array of scholars and amounts to a balanced representation of 
key critical issues. Some of the themes and issues covered include - How Circumstances 
Shape the Available Options; Prospects for a Democratic Transition; Accountability and 
Moral Responsibility;   Documenting the Former Regime; Criminal Sanctions; 
Responsibility of Superiors and Subordinates; Non-Criminal Sanctions and Treatment 
and Compensation of Victims.
33
 
David A. Crocker‘s work on transitional justice sets out a ―normative framework for 
reckoning with past wrongs‖.34 This framework is structured around eight goals or norms 
that Crocker identifies as important ethical issues that require attention if a society is to 
meaningfully deal with its violent past. He notes that most of the work that has been done 
on transitional justice has been of an empirical and strategic nature with legal scholars 
and social scientists dominating the literature.
35
 While Crocker notes the value of these 
inputs he suggests that there is also a need for ethical issues relating to transitional justice 
to also be dealt with; and these issues cannot be adequately addressed by legal scholars or 
                                                 
32
 See International Journal of Transitional Justice, http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/.  
33
 This list is a summation of the Table of Contents from Kritz‘s first volume.  
34
 Crocker, ―Transitional Justice and International Civil Society‖ Constellations 5 (1998); Crocker, 
―Reckoning with Past Wrongs.‖ Ethics and International Affairs 13 (1999); Crocker, ―Truth Commissions, 
Transitional Justice and Civil Society,‖ in Truth v. Justice (2000).  
35
 Crocker 1999:45.  
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social scientists without input from philosophers and applied ethicists. The kind of ethical 
considerations that Crocker seeks to address concern the question of how ‗success‘ ought 
to be viewed within the scope of transitional justice measures; and whether the means 
employed in transitional justice endeavours are in fact consistent with the ends achieved. 
Crocker discusses these and other ethical considerations through turning his attention to 
what he identifies as eight goals of transitional justice; truth, public platform for victims, 
accountability and punishment, rule of law, compensation to victims, institutional reform 
and long-term development, reconciliation and public deliberation. Throughout Crocker‘s 
discussion he displays a strong appreciation for the need to balance the goals of 
transitional justice and the need to concede certain trade-offs.  
 
José Zalaquett also offers a normative framework for dealing with what he calls 
―transitional political situations‖.36 His framework prioritises the tandem goals of 
prevention of future atrocities and the reparation of the damage done. Significantly, 
Zalaquett suggests that ―objectives such as retribution or revenge, cannot be considered 
legitimate‖ because these objectives contradict the values contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
37
 For Zalaquett any attempt to deal with past human rights 
abuses must fulfil three non-negotiable conditions in order to be deemed legitimate – the 
truth must be known, the policy must represent the will of the people and the policy must 
not violate international human rights law.
38
  
 
Whereas the likes of Crocker and Zalaquett have approached transitional justice in terms 
of a normative conceptual framework, others have approached transitional justice in 
terms of emerging principles. Juan Méndez locates the substance of the transitional 
justice debate in terms of ―what is required, what the choices are, and how we should sort 
out the ethical, legal and political consequences of these choices‖.39 He goes on to discuss 
four guiding principles that have emerged within the field and can assist in terms of 
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 Jose Zalaquett, ―Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles 
Applicable and Political Constraints‖ in State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (Aspen Institute, 1989).  
37
 Zalaquett 1989:27.  
38
 Zalaquett 1989:28-30 
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 Méndez ―In Defense of Transitional Justice‖ 1997:4.  
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making the above-mentioned choices.
40
 Méndez‘s principles apply specifically to the 
question of whether or not to prosecute those responsible for human rights violations. 
While he does note that prosecutions are not the only transitional justice mechanism and 
that truth telling and reparations are also important mechanisms, his ―defence of 
transitional justice‖ hinges on criminal prosecutions and the guiding principles relevant in 
terms of prosecutions.  
 
The distinctiveness of transitional justice has also been articulated by way of its relation 
to the fields of criminal justice, international human rights law, conflict resolution and 
democratic transition and consolidation. Miriam J. Aukerman approaches transitional 
justice by establishing a framework that views the goals of transitional justice in terms of 
criminal justice.
41
 Aukerman employs this criminal justice lens so as to critically explore 
the distinction between ordinary crime (as the subject matter of criminal justice) and 
human rights violations or ―radical evil‖42 (as the subject matter of transitional justice). 
She frames transitional justice within the context of criminal justice in terms of the goals 
of prosecution and asks whether prosecution is the best option for contexts of transitional 
justice. Aukerman sets out the goals of ordinary criminal prosecutions and then inquires 
as to whether these goals are on par with the goals of transitional justice. For Aukerman 
the entry point for discussing transitional justice is the field of criminal justice. For others 
like Ruti Teitel the entry point for discussing transitional justice is its relation to the field 
of international human rights law.
43
  
 
Others suggest that not only is transitional justice related to other fields, but it is a 
distinctively interdisciplinary field of inquiry. It is argued that this interdisciplinary 
nature is due to the fact that the requirements of transitional justice are such that existing 
models of justice need to be adapted in order to meet these requirements.
44
 The actors 
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 See Méndez 1997:4-21.  
41
 Aukerman, 2002 ―Extraordinary Evi, Ordinary Crime: A framework for understanding transitional 
justice‖, Harvard Human Rights Journal 15:39-97.  
42
 Immanuel Kant was the first to coin the term ―radical evil‖. It has subsequently been taken up by Hannah 
Arendt and Carlos Nino.  
43
 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, 2000.  
44
 See Rama Mani, ―The Three Dimensions of Justice in Post-conflict Peacebuilding‖, in Beyond 
Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War, 2002:3-22.  
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involved in transitional justice (victims, perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders and 
beneficiaries) have very specific needs when it comes to justice and this necessitates a 
distinct conception of justice that differs from existing models.
45
 Furthermore, the 
transitional setting itself poses certain limitations on the range of accountability measures 
that the new government can realistically pursue. Certain economic, legal, political and 
ethical constraints add to the unique demands of transitional justice.  
 
Transitional justice represents a complex and multi-faceted field of research. This 
interdisciplinary approach importantly acknowledges that there are legal, ethical, political 
and economic dimensions to the task of ―dealing with the past‖, and that no one 
discipline can on its own meet the requirements of transitional justice.
46
Writing in the late 
1990s Martha Minow contributes to this interdisciplinary approach through her 
thoughtful accounts of different responses to mass atrocity in Between Vengeance and 
Forgiveness. She does not use the term ‗transitional justice‘ but her treatment of trials, 
truth commissions, reparations and history education reflect a thread of continuity in that 
all are responses to mass atrocity. Minow‘s contribution to the field is precisely her own 
admission of ―the incompleteness and inescapable inadequacy of each possible response 
to collective atrocities‖ and therefore the challenge of crafting new creative responses.47  
 
This brief discussion explains our contention that transitional justice does represent a 
distinct field of study. And that this distinctiveness lies in the self-limiting nature of 
transitional justice. Renowned human rights activist José Zalaquett has remarked that 
truth and justice initiatives need to be self-limiting.
48
 Following a period of political 
violence and oppression the particular society is confronted with many issues that require 
attention. The task of transitional justice is to promote accountability and 
                                                 
45
 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, 2004.  
46
 Christine Bell has recently challenged the ―conception of transitional justice as a praxis-based 
interdisciplinary field‖. Instead she suggests that transitional justice could be conceived as a ―cloak that 
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acknowledgement in the wake of this violence. The important issues relating to socio-
economic justice and long term transformation are no less pressing but cannot be dealt 
with in self-limiting terms and are on our reading, not the concern of transitional justice 
as a field of study.  
 
As noted earlier, Arthur suggests that the distinctiveness of transitional justice lies in its 
normative aim of ―facilitating a transition to democracy‖.49 Given more recent 
transitional justice experiences Arthur questions the extent to which this distinctiveness 
still holds. She queries whether transitional justice scholars and practitioners should 
develop different mechanisms for dealing with transitions other than those from 
authoritarianism to democracy.  For Arthur the standard transitional justice mechanisms 
like ―prosecutions and vetting are unlikely to be adequate measures in a post –conflict 
setting, where the problem of ex-combatant reintegration requires at least consideration 
of local-level restorative justice approaches‖.50 Arthur also queries the extent to which 
transitional justice is applicable to contexts of historical injustice along the lines of ―long 
term, systematic marginalization, over centuries‖ like the legacies of slavery and 
colonialism.   She contends that it might be the case that transitional justice is particularly 
―designed for the brief duration of a political transition‖ whereas long term legacies of 
oppression require different responses in the form of redress and transformation.
51
 Jon 
Elster seems to share this caution in his separation of transitional justice from broader 
concerns of distributive justice.
52
 We follow this logic.   
 
1.2 Watershed Moments within the Development of Transitional Justice 
 
While the previous discussion has shed some light on the nature of transitional justice as 
a distinctive field of study, further discussion is required in order to establish a 
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 Arthur 2009:358.  
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 Arthur 2009:360.  
51. See Arthur, ―How ‗Transitions‘ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice‖ 
Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009):362.  We note that conceiving of transitional justice in limited terms 
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framework for investigating restorative justice. This section will therefore discuss four 
watershed moments within the development of the field of transitional justice. These 
watershed moments include the Nuremberg Trials, the Latin American truth processes of 
Argentina and Chile, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the 
establishment of international justice mechanisms leading up to the advent of the 
International Criminal Court. The aim of this discussion is to gain a sense of how these 
developments have impacted the understanding of justice within the field of transitional 
justice. This kind of focussed inquiry into the four watershed moments will further assist 
in establishing a framework for exploring the relevance and significance of restorative 
justice for transitional justice.  
 
 
1.2.1 Nuremberg Trials
53
 
 
It is important to reiterate the distinction between Nuremberg as a historical event and the 
principles established by Nuremberg. In terms of the former, the tribunals were flawed 
and problematic on many levels. However, in terms of the latter, some important 
contributions were made to the conception of justice. It is widely recognised that the 
Nuremberg Trials played a decisive role in the development and application of 
international law.
54
 For our current purposes we will focus on what Nuremberg has come 
to represent as a model of justice in the field of transitional justice.  
 
In order to sufficiently understand the contribution of Nuremberg it is necessary to note 
how accountability and amnesty featured in the traditional approach of international law. 
Prior to Nuremberg international law was largely governed by legal positivism, perhaps 
first articulated in the Treaty of Westphalia.  
 
Following the thirty years war the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648.  The treaty 
awarded independence to the 343 separate states and cities within the Empire. Calvinism 
was recognised as an official alternative to Lutheranism and many of the territorial 
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 This generic term includes the original war crimes tribunal held 1945-1946 and the twelve minor 
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disputes were settled.
55
 The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is significant in terms of the 
development of transitional justice due to the introduction of the concept of a sovereign 
state governed by a sovereign. The Treaty established a precedent making the state the 
sole holder of external sovereignty, making interference in other states‘ governance 
illegitimate.
56
 The Westphalia precedent implied that international law must work within 
the framework of national sovereignty. Political leaders of state parties could therefore 
not be subject to international law. In the event that a political leader was responsible for 
ordering and planning gross human rights violations, only national courts could try the 
political leader. Given that this would be highly unlikely, the treaty and its approach to 
state sovereignty entailed impunity for political leaders. 
 
It was only with the Nuremberg Tribunals following World War II that the Westphalia 
precedent was finally broken.
57
 Firstly, by noting that international law does apply to 
individuals. Secondly, through establishing the principle that a court could intervene in 
another society in the case of crimes against humanity.   
 
This category of crimes against humanity represented a new invention. The categories of 
‗crimes against peace‘ and ‗crimes of war‘ had long been recognised in the Just War 
tradition.
58
 The significance of Nuremberg was as an actual application of these 
traditional notions in an international tribunal, and so to the development of international 
law.
59
  It is important to note that the deviation from the Just War tradition implied a 
limitation to the context of international law only; the "internal" human rights violations 
by the Nazi-government of Jews prior to World War II could not be prosecuted as crimes 
against peace or war crimes. It was to overcome this limitation that the notion of ―crimes 
against humanity‖ was added. 
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The notion of ―crimes against humanity‖ challenged the dominant legal positivist 
framework and has since been taken up into transitional justice discourse as well as the 
prevailing approach of international law.
60
 The category of ―crimes against humanity‖ 
also challenged the defence of ―due obedience‖ or ―superior orders‖ by stating that these 
crimes are of such a nature that the due obedience defence does not suffice. It represented 
a major development in international human rights law.  The traditional approach of 
international law and the primacy this accorded to the principle of national sovereignty in 
conjunction with the prevailing notions of "due obedience" and "superior orders" ensured 
an effective impunity to state agents responsible for human rights violations.  In principle 
sovereign states could always grant amnesty to their own official agents and within the 
positivist framework of international law that could not be challenged by external parties. 
So Nuremberg's challenge to the "superior orders" defence for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity effectively amounted to a challenge to the traditional principle of 
national sovereignty and the effective extension of amnesty to state agents. This 
extension of principles of retributive justice beyond the traditional limits of positivist 
international law had a significant impact on the notion of justice.  
 
Nuremberg essentially assumed and involved a notion of retributive justice and the 
utilisation of the criminal justice system as the relevant forum of transitional justice (in 
contrast to prevailing instances of popular justice in the post WWII context as well as an 
alternative to the summary executions as a form of political justice which had initially 
been considered by the Allies in anticipation of the end of the war). From a human rights 
law perspective other issues, such as the new precedents in extending criminal 
prosecution to official agents contrary to their traditional protection by national 
sovereignty, are indeed important. However, for our purposes it is the understanding of 
justice that needs to be highlighted. And in the case of Nuremberg, whatever its 
revolutionary significance for international law, that remained very much the notion of 
retributive justice in the context of (an extended) criminal justice system, i.e. "prosecute 
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and punish" rather than the concerns of restorative justice with an emphasis on reparation 
and reconciliation.  
 
 
1.2.2 Latin American Transitions 
 
In this section we will explore the transitional justice experiences of Argentina and Chile 
and how understandings of justice evolved and developed in each context. In both cases 
the transitions did not arise by way of a complete overthrow or military defeat. The new 
transitional governments were therefore faced with the task of crafting effective 
mechanisms for justice while at the same time not jeopardising the fledgling democracy.   
 
Argentina 
Following the military coup of Isabel Peron on March 24 1976 Argentina entered "the 
most repressive authoritarian regime in Argentine history. Popular indignation with the 
regime's massive human rights violations, coupled with the military's defeat at the hands 
of the British in the Malvinas (Falklands) War and economic disaster, forced the military 
to call free elections in 1982. President Raul Alfonsin won and assumed office in 
December 1983".
61
 It has been estimated that over 9 000 Argentines were abducted, 
tortured, and killed under the military junta.
62
  
 
The transitional justice measures in Argentina were official and comprised of both 
criminal trials and a truth process. The generals were prosecuted successfully but when 
attempts were made to prosecute the lower ranking foot soldiers then the military (who 
still wielded significant power), threatened a rebellion. The new government then decided 
to offer amnesty.
63
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The National Commission on the Disappearance of People (CONADEP) conducted 
closed hearings to investigate the ―disappearances‖ and other gross human rights 
violations perpetrated under the military junta. The final report entitled Nunca Más 
(Never Again!) was completed in 1984 and published in English in 1986 and revealed the 
commission‘s findings regarding disappearances, torture centres and the extensive 
collaboration of citizens with the regime.
64
 It is significant that CONADEP, while 
primarily a victim-oriented truth process, to begin with did not function as an alternative 
to criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators. Rather it was conceived as a parallel 
operation preparing the way for criminal trials, and the findings of the Commission were 
handed over to the prosecuting authorities for follow-up action.  Even so the publication 
of the Nunca Más report which detailed the truth process, made a major public impact in 
its own right. When the criminal prosecutions subsequently came unstuck and the civilian 
government eventually was forced to grant amnesties the significance of the Commission 
and the truth process remained.  Though perhaps not quite intended as such the 
Commission thus came to have a major role in the Argentinean transitional justice 
experience. 
 
Following the Commission the military‘s self-amnesty laws were repealed and allowed 
the commencement of trials of the junta leaders. The first round of trials saw nine junta 
leaders convicted of over seven hundred human rights violations.
65
 Human rights 
organisations were adamant that prosecutions should not stop there and by December 
1986 over six thousand cases were due to be heard.
66
 Significantly, the Alfonsin 
government initially attempted to avoid a direct confrontation with the military by getting 
them to conduct the prosecutions themselves through their own military tribunals.
67
  
When the military was not prepared to play their allotted part in this the prosecutions 
reverted to the civilian courts leading to the escalation of thousands of prospective cases 
by the end of 1986. In turn, the threat of prosecution now not only for the top members of 
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the junta but also of other ranks of military officers lead to the Easter Rebellion, and the 
civilian government backing down by introducing the Full Stop Law on 23 December 
1986. This was a necessary compromise forced on the civilian government by the threats 
of military backlash. This law placed a deadline of sixty days within which to bring cases 
before a final cut off. Rather than minimise the case load the Full Stop Law actually had 
the reverse effect of encouraging human rights organisations to bring even more cases.
68
 
The situation worsened when the military embarked on a series of uprisings with the 
intent being to pressurise the government into halting the prosecutions. Ultimately this is 
exactly what happened when in June 1987 the Law of Due Obedience was passed thereby 
preventing the prosecution of low ranking officials.
69
   
 
The relevant understanding of justice involved in the Argentinean criminal trials was that 
of retributive justice consistent with the Nuremberg model.  The difference with 
Nuremberg was, of course, that the context was not that of international justice but played 
itself out in the national political arena where the civilian government and the judiciary, 
though supported by a strong human rights movement pushing for trials and prosecutions, 
had to reckon with the still considerable power base of the military. The Argentine 
experience is an interesting illustration of how the residual power of the outgoing regime 
(the military junta) can pose a serious threat to transitional justice processes. For our 
current purposes the key question is whether the Alfonsin government‘s Law of Due 
Obedience represented a shift in the understanding of justice. Arguably the Law of Due 
Obedience involved an attempt to introduce a limited form of effective amnesty for 
certain categories of perpetrators. This represents quite a shift from Nuremberg‘s 
rejection of ―due obedience‖ and ―superior orders‖ as justifications for human rights 
violations.  It could be argued that this Law of Due Obedience and the limited amnesty it 
offered represents a limitation of retributive justice due to concerns with political 
stability.  
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The obvious question is why the transitional government had been so dedicated to 
pursuing truth and justice at the outset, and then become more and more reluctant as time 
went by. Right from the start President Alfonsin described the overall aim of his 
approach as an endeavour geared ―not so much to punish as to prevent‖.70 This quote may 
reflect that Alfonsin may have had an awareness of the overall context and therefore 
prioritised certain objectives for the transitional justice process. Alfonsin‘s objectives 
were perhaps different to those of civil society in that, the Alfonsin government, unlike 
the human rights movements, were not solely committed to a retributive justice approach. 
 
The Argentine case reflects an interesting ambivalence in terms of the relevant 
understandings of justice.  On one level the Argentine experience was characterised by a 
strong commitment to criminal prosecutions and retributive justice similar to the 
Nuremberg model. While on another level the Commission also initiated a momentous 
truth process while the criminal justice efforts were overtaken by enforced compromises 
involving amnesty. 
 
Chile 
The Chilean transition was preceded by more than sixteen years of repressive military 
rule involving extensive detentions, torture and disappearances of political opponents.
71
 
In March 1990 Patricio Aylwin was elected as the first civilian president. The Chilean 
transition involved a complex process leading from economic liberalisation, some 
political reforms, the unintended outcomes of referenda to a controlled restoration of 
civilian government with the military withdrawing from direct political interference but 
retaining extensive security powers and insisting on amnesty for themselves as a 
condition of allowing democratic elections.
72
 Huntington classifies the Chilean transition 
as a top-down liberalisation that saw the military still in position of significant power 
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with General Augusto Pinochet still as head of the army.
73
 The sustained military 
autonomy meant that with Pinochet still commander-in-chief he had economic and 
political clout that set decided limits on the extent and powers of civilian rule.
74
    
 
The amnesty enjoyed by the armed forces was stipulated as a condition for civilian rule 
and precluded possible prosecutions of the military perpetrators responsible for the 
torture, deaths and disappearances since 1972
75. This meant that any attempt to ―deal 
with the past‖ could not be launched in the name of retributive justice focused on 
perpetrators but could at best be victim-oriented in a non-prosecutorial context. These 
constraints meant that ―truth‖, rather than (retributive) ―justice‖ became the key concern 
of the Chilean transitional justice process. 
 
At the time of transition Chilean society was buoyed by a very strong human rights 
movement. The influence of these human rights organisations was enhanced by the 
alliance formed with President Aylwin. A presidential decree established the Chilean 
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. It is significant that the Chilean 
commission was the first to use the designation Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
Compared to the Argentine Commission the use of Truth in the name of the Commission 
was also significant. Most significant, though, was that the Chilean Commission was 
appointed in a context where there could not be any prospect of criminal prosecutions of 
perpetrators. 
 
The mandate of the commission was aimed at forming as comprehensive a picture as 
possible of the antecedents, circumstances and evidence surrounding the violations of 
human rights that had been committed under the military dictatorship. Due to the 
clandestine nature of the atrocities the commission was also charged with uncovering the 
fate of the many disappeared persons. Popkin and Roht-Arriaza note that the 
commission‘s mandate was specifically focussed on death and disappearances, not on 
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torture.
76
 The exclusion of torture is closely linked to the power the military still enjoyed 
and how this impacted the limited the nature of the "truth" process that was undertaken. 
In the case of torture surviving victims could testify to what had happened, but in the case 
of unexplained deaths and disappearances there were no surviving victims available to 
testify to the role of the military.  
 
Another key focus of the commission was to make recommendations regarding 
reparations and preventative measures. The Chilean commission is often signalled out for 
its extensive reparations programme.
77
 In February 1992 the National Corporation for 
Reparation and Reconciliation was established to administer monthly pension payouts, 
medical benefits and education subsidies to those affected by the atrocities of the past.
78
 
Aside from reparation programmes the commission also made recommendations for 
human rights education initiatives, institutional reform and memorialisation initiatives. 
For our purposes it is worth pondering to what extent this focus on reparation can be 
linked to the Commission‘s mandate in terms of a more general restorative mission.  
 
It is interesting to note that Zalaquett as a key member of the Chilean truth commission 
argues that the limited focus of the Commission was not just a matter of an externally 
imposed limitation, instead he emphasises that the Chilean truth process amounted to a 
self-limiting project. On the one hand this is connected to Zalaquett's critique of the 
Argentinean transitional justice process as having failed due to having been over-
ambitious (i.e. attempting to take on the military in criminal prosecutions when the power 
balance did not allow that). On the other hand, it is related to the relevant priority of 
"justice" and "truth" as primary principles and objectives. A certain reading and 
interpretation of the Chilean transitional justice process assumes that "justice" was and 
should be the primary principle and objective, failing which the Chileans had to settle for 
a more limited and constrained "truth" process. It is against this that Zalaquett reverses 
                                                 
76
 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 84.  
77
 Kritz refers to the Chilean case as ―exceptional‖ due to the interplay of a relatively small amount of 
victims coupled with a healthy economy. ―Where We Are and How We Got Here‖, 2002:44.  
78
 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 86.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
31 
 
the priorities and articulates the primary goal of the commission as the pursuit of ―the 
truth, and justice to the extent possible‖.79  
 
The Chilean truth commission was framed in terms of the objectives of ―reparation and 
prevention‖, utilising the means of ―truth and justice‖ with the end result being ―genuine 
reconciliation‖ and ―a lasting social peace‖.80  From a broader transitional justice 
perspective the Chilean experience represents a key moment in terms of shifting from a 
wholly retributive paradigm towards an approach to justice that is more focussed on 
restoration and reconciliation.  
 
 
1.2.3 South African TRC 
 
The apartheid era saw millions of black South Africans endure the worst kind of daily 
discrimination and oppression.
81
 This systemic injustice was augmented by widespread 
gross human rights violations perpetrated by state personnel against anti-apartheid 
activists. These violations included torture, abduction and killings. The anti-apartheid 
struggle eventually responded with violent means, after initially pursuing non-violent 
options. Prior to the negotiated settlement of the early 1990s the situation in the country 
was of such a precarious nature that many deemed the conflict intractable. It is no small 
matter that the architects of the transition were able to navigate a relatively peaceful 
transition.  Most accounts of the negotiations and the peaceful elections that followed do 
in fact use the term ―miracle‖. It is against this backdrop that the TRC needs to be 
understood.    
 
Within the transitional justice literature the South African transitional justice experience 
is signalled out as exceptional and precedent setting for various reasons, chiefly due to 
the amnesty invention of the South African TRC and the way in which this invention was 
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interpreted. Compared to the Chilean transition the South African case crucially involved 
a negotiated settlement with different implications for the amnesty and truth processes. 
The importance and nature of this negotiation process is often neglected in accounts of 
South Africa‘s transition.82 While a full discussion of this complex negotiation process is 
beyond the scope of this current discussion, it must be noted that the TRC process and the 
accompanying amnesty are direct outgrowths of the preceding negotiation processes.  
 
A helpful starting point in discussing the South African TRC is the Postamble to the 
Interim Constitution. The Postamble speaks of addressing the past with the recognition 
 ―that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for 
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation. In 
order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted 
in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under 
this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date , which shall be 
a date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the 
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through 
which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been 
passed‖.83    
 
For the purpose of our enquiry there are at least three key points that emanate from the 
Postamble. Firstly, the Postamble explicitly frames the process in terms of an 
acknowledged need for ―dealing with the past‖. In other words, the process is not 
primarily framed in terms of ―justice‖ or even of ―truth‖ but rather in terms of a political 
understanding of the need for ―reconciliation‖. In light of the Nuremberg, Argentine and 
Chilean models this represents a significant departure. Secondly, it may be noted that 
amnesty is presented not as an externally imposed constraint due to the power of the 
military as in Chile, but as part and parcel of the negotiated settlement.  Even so, it 
obviously implied significant constraints on the new sovereign legislature of the new 
democracy.  While the specifics of the amnesty procedures were left open for 
determination by Parliament the sovereign legislature was bound by the amnesty 
agreement written into the Interim Constitution.  Thirdly, it is crucial to note that the 
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Postamble did not provide for a Truth Commission or truth process.  That was 
subsequently added by parliament and the Government of National Unity and explicitly 
based on the key formulations of the Postamble but it was not required by the Postamble 
itself. 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that the Postamble itself emerged out of intense 
processes and discussions facilitated by South African civil society actors. Moreover a 
rigorous parliamentary process saw extensive debate in the run up to the formulation of 
the TRC legislation. We shall return in the discussion to follow to key moments in these 
parliamentary debates.  
 
There are many unique aspects of the South African TRC that set it apart from other truth 
commissions; however a discussion of these aspects is not directly relevant to our current 
purposes.
84
 We are reviewing the South African TRC as a watershed moment in the 
development of transitional justice. To this end we will focus on the amnesty provisions 
of the TRC as this has continued significance for the way in which justice is conceived in 
transitional contexts.  
 
The amnesty offered was unique in its conditionality.
85
  Previously amnesties typically 
took the form of general or blanket amnesties by sovereign decree.  As such amnesty both 
ensured that perpetrators would have impunity in not being accountable under the law 
and effectively prevented truth processes.  On both counts the South African version 
differed significantly. It required perpetrators to make individual applications and to meet 
the requirements and procedures of quasi-legal tribunals. And it built in a truth-process 
through the requirement of full disclosure.  In these ways the significance and 
implications of the South African amnesty are quite different within a transitional justice 
perspective and for an understanding of the notion of justice involved.  
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Perhaps the legacy of the South African TRC is the manner in which the truth 
commission model was able to serve as a legitimate alternative to prosecutions without 
being deemed a second best option. In the 1995 parliamentary discussions in the run up to 
the TRC then Minister of Justice Dullah Omar made a significant statement framing the 
amnesty provision as consistent with the goals of promoting the rule of law and human 
rights. For Omar, the amnesty as tied to the TRC‘s ―victim-centred‖ approach meant that 
the country could ―deal with our past on a morally acceptable basis and make it possible 
to establish the rule of law‖. The rule of law would be established ―on the basis of the 
recognition of human rights and the building of a human rights culture‖. Omar 
concluded, ―we are building a future for South Africans‖ and as ―there is a conflict 
between what the international community is saying and what is in the interests of the 
people of South Africa then I think that we will have to live with that kind of conflict‖.86 
Omar‘s statement was uttered in response to the submission by Amnesty International 
that questioned the extent to which the proposed amnesty provision would amount to a 
contravention of international law. Omar‘s suggestion that the amnesty provision was in 
fact in favour of human rights and rule of law - only differently conceived, is reflected in 
other accounts of the TRC as a ―different kind of justice‖87 or a ―third way‖.88  
 
Another aspect in which the TRC advanced a different understanding of justice is through 
the links made between truth and justice. The TRC Report identifies four senses of 
truth
89
. 1) factual / forensic truth as evidence and information which is objectively 
verifiable.  2) Personal / narrative truth which could be stories and personal accounts or 
memories which may not be verifiable but have important value. 3) Social / dialogical 
truth – Albie Sachs refers to this kind of truth as the ―truth of experience that is 
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established through interaction, discussion and debate‖.90  And then 4) Healing / 
restorative truth which suggests that through acknowledging the truth about past hurts 
some kind of healing or restoration is made possible.   
 
The latter two senses of truth while possibly the most problematic and elusive of the 
senses of truth differentiated by the TRC, are the most pertinent for our current purposes. 
Writing after the victims‘ hearings André du Toit sheds some light on how to understand 
how truth and justice featured in the TRC. Du Toit explores the moral foundations of the 
TRC by examining the TRC‘s conceptions of truth as acknowledgement and justice as 
recognition.
91
 Du Toit explains justice as recognition as involving the ―restoration of the 
human and civic dignity of victims‖.92 While du Toit does not explicitly refer to 
‗restorative justice‘ he does make a clear distinction between justice as recognition and 
other senses of justice, criminal or distributive.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that the amnesty and truth processes were not really 
connected. Amnesty was not decided on by the TRC commissioners but by the political 
elites during the negotiated settlement. The dual nature of the TRC process in terms of 
the largely separate truth and amnesty processes has resulted in an ambiguous dual legacy 
for the TRC, and perhaps for the notion of justice advanced by the TRC. The victim and 
amnesty hearings were quite different.  The victims‘ hearings were deliberately non-
judicial in nature, objectives and procedures. A great deal of the interest and significance 
of the victim hearings was precisely in the extent to which they functioned as an 
alternative model to standard criminal trials, e.g. in being non-adversarial, victim-
oriented rather than perpetrator-focused and not primarily committed to the requirements 
of due process and the rules of evidence.  As against this the amnesty hearings were 
quasi-judicial, with procedures and objectives closer to those of criminal trials though not 
quite the "real" thing -- but also much less victim-friendly. The Commission‘s 
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commitment to perpetrator findings indicates a basic ambivalence in its approach to 
―justice‖. While the TRC was widely taken to be not sufficiently committed to retributive 
justice (due to the amnesty process as well as the prominence of notions of reconciliation 
and restorative justice) the perpetrator findings amounted to a belated attempt to achieve 
some minimal version of retribution.  
 
In this sense the TRC‘s approach to transitional justice is marked by a residual ambiguity. 
This said, it remains the case that most interpretations of the TRC locate its focus in 
terms of a restorative understanding of justice. And, when viewed in contrast to the 
Nuremberg and Latin American cases, the notion of justice at play in the TRC is certainly 
more on the side of restorative than retributive.  
 
1.2.4 International Tribunals - ICTY, ICTR, ICC 
 
The question of the relevance and significance of international tribunals for transitional 
justice is largely an open question, and not without controversy. For some the growth and 
development of international law as a dominant response to gross human rights violations 
speaks to a hegemony of ―Western‖ notions of retributive justice.93 The question may be 
asked whether and to what extent the ICC, though no doubt a major development in 
international law should be regarded as part of the domain of transitional justice? The 
permanent court could be viewed as an attempt to ―normalise‖ transitional justice 
processes and interventions and to establish a permanent and longer term framework for 
dealing with gross human rights violations rather than in the ―exceptional‖ context of 
―transitions‖.94  
 
Security Council Resolution 808 of 1993 saw the formal establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Dusko Tadic was the 
first to be convicted in 1997; twenty eight more convictions were made by 2003. The 
ICTY has made serious inroads by trying high ranking Serb, Croat and Bosnian military 
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officials, not least of which is the indictment of Slobodan Milošević. Security Council 
Resolution 955 of 1994 formally established the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTR issued the world‘s first conviction for genocide to Jean-Paul 
Akayesu for nine counts of genocide. Furthermore the ICTR succeeded in the first 
successful conviction of a former head of state Prime Minister Jean Kambanda.
95
 Another 
significant development made by the ICTR was the inclusion of rape as part of the 
category of crimes against humanity.  
 
These apparent successes aside, the establishment of the two temporary tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been met with mixed reactions. On one score the tribunals 
reflect a strong message that state actors can no longer enjoy impunity – that the 
Westphalia precedent is broken. While on another score, the tribunals have been roundly 
criticised for being unhelpful interventions from outside actors with a particular agenda. 
It has also been argued that it is problematic that both the ICTY (The Hague) and the 
ICTR (Arusha, Tanzania) are geographically removed from the victims and citizens of 
the Balkans and Rwanda. This geographical dislocation is compounded by the fact that 
most of the staff are internationally sourced. While Kritz suggests that this international 
involvement is favourable as it guards against any accusations of ‗victors‘ justice‘ it can 
also be argued that ultimately the lack of local involvement translates into a missed 
opportunity for much-needed institutional reform in both countries.
96
 
 
These weaknesses have been addressed by the establishment of so-called hybrid tribunals 
that combine the resources of the UN with local staff. Prominent examples to date are the 
Sierra Leone Special Court and the Iraqi Special Tribunal.   However, one could argue 
that these hybrid tribunals address problems relevant to an international human rights law 
perspective, and not in terms of the broader transitional justice concerns.  
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Regardless of these divergent opinions on the merits of the tribunals the fact remains, the 
formation of these tribunals reflects an assumption that transitional justice necessarily 
ought to entail legal justice and sanction.  This preference for prosecutions has been 
further entrenched by the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court. 
The Rome Conference of 1998 saw 120 states vote to adopt the statute of the ICC. The 
court was officially established on 1 July 2002 with the aim of ensuring global 
deterrence, developing standards of international law and curbing impunity for 
perpetrators of human rights violations. The Rome Statute obligates its signatories to 
investigate and prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
97
 While the 
significance of the ICC for International Law is clear, for our purposes the question 
concerns its relevance and significance for transitional justice.  
 
The ICC differs from the ICTY and ICTR in at least three significant ways. Firstly the 
court‘s statute includes the principle of complementarity which ensures that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC does not eclipse national courts‘ jurisdiction. This is a significant 
point in ensuring that individual countries plot their own chart for transitional justice. The 
ICC‘s intervention is restricted to instances when the country in question is either 
unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute cases.
98
 Secondly the Rome Statute 
prohibits retroactive jurisdiction so only crimes committed after the ICC‘s inception (July 
2002) can be investigated. This principle does place serious limitations on the scope of 
the ICC‘s investigative mandate, and has implications for the Court‘s relevance to 
transitional justice in that crimes prior to 2002 cannot be investigated. Also, only state 
parties fall under the ICC‘s jurisdiction. To date 91 countries have ratified the Rome 
Statute and hence become member state parties, there remain a further 50 countries that 
have signed but not yet ratified. The ratification of the Rome Statute requires that 
countries incorporate the substance of the statute into national legislation. A third 
important difference is that the ICC, unlike the ICTY and ICTR is independent of the 
United Nations. Where the ICTY and ICTR were created by the UN Security Council, the 
ICC came about through a multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute. It is also worth noting 
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that the ICC differs from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in that the ICC is able to 
prosecute individuals while the ICJ is restricted to civil prosecution.   
 
Due to the prohibition against retroactive jurisdiction most of the ICC‘s interventions 
have mainly been in Africa. The Court has made three significant steps in Africa. 
Charges against the Court‘s first accused Thomas Lubanga have been confirmed and 
Lubanga has been moved to The Hague, arrest warrants have been issued to ICC suspects 
in Darfur,
99
 and the third development relates to the impact of ICC intervention in the 
tense northern Ugandan peace negotiations.  
 
The intervention of the ICC in the Northern Ugandan situation is highly controversial and 
in many ways illustrates the contrasting perspectives and requirements of transitional 
justice and international human rights law. Briefly put the controversy is due to a tension 
between local Ugandan organisations and groups who favour traditional justice 
mechanisms to address the human rights violations perpetrated during the country‘s long 
civil war and  others (mostly international NGOs) who favour the intervention of the ICC 
and the indictment of key ringleaders of the conflict. These tensions will be fully 
discussed in Chapter Four, for our current purposes it is sufficient to note that transitional 
justice needs to be responsive to a far wider range of actors than international law.  And 
that international tribunals are perhaps unable to achieve acknowledgement of a painful 
past as well as meaningful accountability. The resistance to the ICC‘s intervention in 
Northern Uganda affirms Arthur‘s point that by ―placing decisions about justice squarely 
in the sphere of international law‖ the implication is ―the dissolution of transitional 
justice itself‖.100  
 
The Ugandan case along with the DRC and Sudanese cases have yet to be resolved and 
this makes it difficult to make any firm conclusions about how the development of the 
international court has impacted on transitional justice. Certainly, the emphasis on 
criminal prosecutions does tie in to notions of justice that are retributive and adversarial.  
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1.3 A Framing Account of Transitional Justice 
 
This chapter has sought to develop a framing account of transitional justice that will serve 
as a canvas for the discussion of three different approaches to restorative justice.  
 
Section one of this chapter explored the nature of transitional justice as a distinct field of 
study that is concerned with a distinguishable phenomenon. The distinctiveness of 
transitional justice as a field lies in its self-limiting character. Transitional justice is 
specifically concerned with dealing with gross human rights violations perpetrated by 
state actors against citizens and citizens against one another. The transitional justice 
project is not aimed at dealing with a general sense of past burdens nor with long 
histories of inequality, poverty and oppression. The transitional justice endeavour is more 
specific, located in the period after mass atrocity, the transitional justice endeavour is 
about prioritising a specific set of dilemmas that have to be dealt with in order to move 
on and tackle broader issues of injustice and transformation.  
 
The transitional justice question then is what needs to be prioritised. The answer to this 
question will by necessity be contextual and will differ from place to place. One of the 
major dilemmas of transitional justice is that often there is a range of pressing needs and 
certain difficult choices will have to be made. These choices are often informed and 
influenced by certain constraints. 
 
Moreover, as a distinct field of study, transitional justice is discussed in different ways 
ranging from a particular set of themes & issues to a certain normative and conceptual 
framework; a set of emergent principles and in relation to other established fields (e.g. 
criminal justice / international law). These different approaches make for a field that is 
interdisciplinary. This interdisciplinary nature is heavily influenced by the different 
actors involved in transitional justice - victims, perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders 
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and beneficiaries.  These actors have different and at times even competing needs when it 
comes to justice and this necessitates a unique conception of justice.  
 
Furthermore, the transitional setting itself poses certain limitations on the range of 
accountability measures that the new government can realistically pursue. Certain 
economic, legal, political and ethical constraints add to the unique demands of 
transitional justice. This was illustrated in section two by exploring the different 
approaches to justice at play in the watershed moments of the Nuremberg Trials, the 
Latin American truth processes of Argentina and Chile, the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and the establishment of international justice mechanisms 
leading up to the advent of the International Criminal Court. These four watershed 
moments each carry certain significance in terms of different understandings of justice. 
Luc Huyse suggests that these turning points have led to ―a move from a de facto 
dichotomy (impunity or trials) to multiple conceptions of justice and reconciliation – 
state and non-state instruments, legal, semi-judicial and non-judicial techniques‖.101   
 
During the Nuremberg trials the dominant understanding of justice was one closely 
aligned with a retributive perspective and the trials reflected an extension of retributive 
principles by way of extending criminal justice to international war crimes. This 
retributive understanding of justice was also evident in the truth and justice processes that 
followed the Argentine transition. The initial focus on criminal prosecutions was 
tempered by the residual power still in the hand of the military. The Alfonsin government 
was forced to compromise on prosecutions by granting the Law of Due Obedience which 
saw an effective amnesty to certain perpetrators. This placed a definite limitation on the 
expanded retributive approach to justice as pursued in the Nuremberg case. The 
Argentine transitional justice experience still employed a retributive approach to justice 
but this was tempered by concerns for political stability.  
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The Chilean case was marked by severe existing military power and meant that 
prosecutions were not an option. Some commentators interpret this state of affairs as 
showing that the Chileans opted for truth as oppose to prosecutions as a second best 
option. However, one of the architects of the commission, José Zalaquett   refutes this 
and instead suggests that the goal of the commission was ―truth and justice to the extent 
possible‖. The Chilean transitional justice experience employed a very different 
understanding of justice to that of Nuremberg and Argentina, with an emphasis on truth 
and reparation rather than retribution. The South African transitional justice experience 
goes even further than the Chilean case and has been described as a ―different kind of 
justice‖ with truth and amnesty as a legitimate alternative to prosecutions without being 
deemed a second best option. The South African transitional justice experience does 
reflect elements of retributive justice in its perpetrator findings but from a comparative 
perspective certainly advanced an approach to justice far more concerned with restoration 
and reconciliation.  
 
The advent and development of international tribunals and the ICC reflects a growing 
ascendancy of the phenomenon of international law. This emphasis on criminal 
prosecutions does entail a focus on more retributive approaches to justice but not in the 
expanded sense of Nuremberg because there are certain limitations to the ICC‘s 
jurisdiction and powers. The ICC‘s intervention is only legitimate when a country is 
―unwilling or unable‖ to deal with the prosecutions domestically. As will be shown in 
Chapter 4, the development of international law has entailed a renewed appreciation for 
the importance of a society crafting its own transitional justice responses.  
 
Viewed together the various aspects of this chapter have sought to sketch a framework of 
transitional justice that embodies at least four features. Firstly, we have highlighted the 
need for a conception of justice that is self-limiting and thereby focuses on a specific set 
of dilemmas. Secondly, a transitional justice framework ought to be responsive to the 
needs of victims, perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders and beneficiaries. The modalities 
and degrees of this responsiveness will necessarily differ from context to context and 
questions of dominance and power almost certainly compromise the extent to which other 
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actors are considered. A pertinent point in this regard is Arthur‘s assertion that standard 
transitional justice mechanisms like ―prosecutions and vetting are unlikely to be adequate 
measures in a post –conflict setting, where the problem of ex-combatant reintegration 
requires at least consideration of local-level restorative justice approaches‖.102 This 
emphasis on responsiveness to the needs of particular actors opens up a space for 
conceiving of justice in terms not solely retributive.  
 
A third factor noted in this chapter is the need for a transitional justice framework that is 
realistic and feasible within economic, legal and ethical constraints. The four watershed 
moments discussed in section two of this chapter illustrated that the process of working 
out this feasibility entails certain trade-offs and compromise. The limit to these trade-offs 
is provided by the fourth feature, namely that a transitional justice framework aim toward 
the dual goals of acknowledgement and accountability. Acknowledgement of the 
suffering of victims and acknowledgement of the role of beneficiaries and bystanders, 
with accountability for perpetrators and collaborators. If these four aspects  represent the 
four corners of our transitional justice canvas then the actual cloth of the canvas must be 
Jon Elster‘s assertion that transitional justice is ultimately about a society judging 
itself.
103
 Or, as Zalaquett framed it, that the policy must represent the will of the people, 
without violating international law.
104
  
 
It is with this transitional justice framework as a backdrop that we now turn to explore 
three different conceptions of restorative justice.  
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Chapter Two 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Conception of Restorative Justice 
 
Within the emerging field of transitional justice Archbishop Desmond Tutu is widely 
regarded as the most notable advocate of ―restorative justice‖, predominantly through his 
role as the chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). Writing in the foreword to the first issue of the International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, Tutu suggests that the goals of transitional justice are ―justice, peace 
and reconciliation‖.105 He then goes on to say what he means by ‗justice‘, 
characteristically stressing its restorative force in contrast to more traditional notions of 
retributive justice. He refers to the TRC‘s approach as one of ―merciful justice; of what 
can be achieved when enemies choose dialogue over violence‖.106  This approach, argues 
Tutu, embodies the goals of restoration and reconciliation. This chapter will show that for 
Tutu justice is not a final or absolute principle (as it might be for human rights theorists) 
but rather that it is a secondary value in relation to the goals of restoration and 
reconciliation.  
 
This chapter investigates Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice with a view to its 
relevance for and potential contribution to the wider context of transitional justice. In 
order to unpack Tutu‘s notion of restorative justice it is necessary, firstly to make clear 
Tutu‘s role in relation to the TRC. We then turn to a full discussion of Tutu‘s theology 
concerning restorative justice and plot the extent to which there is continuity of thought 
before and after the TRC. With a grasp of Tutu‘s theology in place we then attempt to 
distil certain elements of Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice. This chapter concludes 
with some remarks on the relevance and significance of Tutu‘s conception of restorative 
justice for the context of transitional justice.  
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2.1 Tutu and the TRC – Distinct but Related 
 
Desmond Mpilo Tutu was born on October 7, 1931 in the town of Klerksdorp.
107
 In 1955 
Tutu married Nomalizo Leah Shenxana. After a brief stint as a school teacher (1955-
1957) Tutu commenced theological studies and was ordained as an Anglican Priest in 
1961. A year after his ordination Tutu was awarded a scholarship at Kings College in 
London. From 1962-1967 Tutu and his family lived in London. After returning back to 
South Africa Tutu was made Dean of St. Mary‘s Cathedral in Johannesburg, the first time 
this post had been awarded to a black Priest. In 1976 Tutu was made Bishop of Lesotho. 
As political tensions worsened in the country Tutu‘s ministry became more public with 
him delivering a famous sermon at Steve Biko‘s funeral in 1977. In 1978 Tutu was 
appointed as the General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, again this 
was an historic appointment as it was the first time a black person has been appointed to 
the position. Tutu held this position until 1985. During this period he became a prominent 
anti-apartheid figure, even being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. In 1986 Tutu 
was enthroned as the first black Archbishop of Cape Town – the highest position in the 
Anglican Church in South Africa. From 1986 to 1994 Tutu played a leading role as an 
influential clergy person speaking out against apartheid. It therefore hardly came as a 
surprise when Tutu was appointed as Chairperson of the TRC in 1995. Following Tutu‘s 
involvement in the TRC he has continued to speak out against injustice, particularly 
against the scourge of HIV/AIDS in the country. In 2007 Tutu was instrumental in 
launching ―the Elders‖ as a group of influential and well respected human rights activists 
from around the world to advise and lobby for peace and security in some of the most 
conflict ridden areas.  
 
This highly condensed chronology of Tutu‘s life illustrates that the TRC was but one part 
of a long line of anti-apartheid work. It could therefore be said that Tutu‘s presence 
within transitional justice literature is due to an often over-stated identification of him 
and the overall TRC process. In terms of the TRC it is important to note that Tutu was 
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not directly involved in the origins, planning and development of the TRC framework 
itself. Tutu played no particular part in the whole process which led from the negotiated 
settlement and the Post-amble of the Interim Constitution in 1993, through the 
development of proposals for a Truth Commission by civil society agents, the process of 
Parliamentary hearings from 1994, the complicated negotiations around the TRC Act in 
Parliament in 1995, the public debate and response by civil society to key controversial 
aspects of the TRC Act, the process of hearings and nomination of the Commission. 
Tutu's appointment as chair of the TRC at the end of 1995 happened after the political 
mandate and legislative framework of the TRC had already been negotiated and 
confirmed in various ways. This means that Tutu most definitely did not have a blank 
slate or open mandate to fashion the TRC according to his own notions. On the contrary, 
in so far as particular (political) notions of reconciliation and amnesty had already been 
incorporated into the TRC's mandate and legislative framework Tutu's personal 
(theological and religious) notions of reconciliation had to relate to these, setting up 
potential conflicts and tensions.  
 
Without minimising Tutu‘s contribution to the TRC process it is important to note that 
there are important differences between Tutu‘s appraisal of the TRC and his notion of 
restorative justice and the official rationale upon which the TRC Act was based.   It is 
important to emphasise that this chapter will explore Tutu‘s conception of restorative 
justice and not the so-called restorative character of the TRC in general. Given Tutu‘s 
central role as chairperson of the TRC he did substantially influence the mood and tone 
of the victims‘ hearings; it would nonetheless be overly simplistic to equate Tutu‘s 
thought and persona with the overall TRC process.  
 
A particular case in point relates to Tutu‘s understanding of the amnesty clause versus 
other competing accounts from within the TRC. In No Future Without Forgiveness Tutu 
justifies the conditional amnesty offered by the TRC by appealing to restorative 
justice.
108
 He responds to the charge that justice was sacrificed with the amnesty clause 
by suggesting that a restorative paradigm of justice was at work within the TRC, not a 
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retributive paradigm and therefore ‗justice‘ was not sacrificed; only differently 
conceptualised.    
 
It is however noteworthy that a research report written during the victims‘ hearings takes 
quite a different view of the ‗TRC‘s justice‘ than that articulated by Tutu. While the 
author of the report Wilhelm Verwoerd does make use of key restorative justice texts,
109
 
he does not explicitly state that the TRC is deliberately employing a restorative justice 
paradigm. He responds to criticisms that the TRC does not bring the victims a sense of 
‗justice‘ by arguing that the TRC ―contributes to the greater justice of a newly democratic 
South African social order‖.110 He defends the amnesty offered by the TRC by noting the 
inevitable compromise that had to be settled for during the negotiation process. As an 
official research report for the TRC the stance on amnesty is surprisingly different to that 
of Archbishop Tutu, the Commission‘s chairperson.  
 
The Postamble to the Interim Constitution upon which the TRC Act was based does 
encapsulate a preference for a restorative approach: ―[T]here is a need for understanding 
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but 
not for victimisation‖.111 This ―need for ubuntu‖ does not necessarily translate into Tutu‘s 
interpretation as articulated in No Future Without Forgiveness. Tutu gives the impression 
that a restorative approach was a deliberate decision made prior to the commencement of 
the hearings. Verwoerd‘s report seems to suggest otherwise.  
 
While this discrepancy is of concern for more general work on the TRC it does help to 
illustrate that Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice is not to be made synonymous with 
the overall TRC process. It is important to note both Tutu‘s contribution to the TRC 
process and the lasting impact that the process had on his thoughts on restorative justice. 
If we examine Tutu‘s theological framework prior to the TRC we will note the 
foundation upon which Tutu constructed his notion of restorative justice.   
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2.2 The Theological Basis of Tutu‘s Conception of Restorative Justice 
 
An extensive survey of Tutu‘s sermons and writings has revealed that it is impossible to 
separate his theology from his conception of restorative justice. Indeed Tutu‘s conception 
of restorative justice is deeply rooted in his theology. This section will offer a bird‘s eye 
view of some of the key aspects of Tutu‘s theology that has a bearing on his conception 
of restorative justice.  
 
What will be evident is that there is a clear line of continuity running through Tutu‘s pre-
TRC theology and post-TRC theology. While there is this continuity, there are also 
clearly distinguishable points of emphasis that enjoyed more attention pre-TRC and some 
that enjoyed more attention post-TRC.   In the period before the TRC Tutu does not yet 
refer explicitly to ―restorative justice‖ but speaks more about his theology of 
‗reconciliation‘.112 The discussion to follow shows that Tutu's theology of 'reconciliation' 
provides the building blocks for his conception of restorative justice. It is perhaps the 
TRC that gives shape to these building blocks and ultimately assists Tutu in articulating 
his thoughts in terms of ―restorative justice‖.  
 
During the 1996-1998 TRC process Tutu‘s public statements and interventions definitely 
show a strong emphasis on the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation, especially 
interpersonal reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This is wholly consistent 
with his earlier pre-TRC statements about reconciliation and with his theology in general. 
It appears to be only at a relatively late stage and in retrospect that Tutu explicitly 
designated the TRC as a model restorative justice experiment. After the TRC hearings of 
1996-97 he begins to make explicit mention of ―restorative justice‖, first in the 
Chairperson‘s foreword to the TRC‘s 1998 Report and then in his autobiography No 
Future Without Forgiveness (2000). Tutu‘s concerns with restorative justice crystallised 
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in the years following the TRC and actually reflect the strong influence that the TRC 
process had on his thought.   
 
The most salient facet of Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice is its theological basis. 
A survey of both primary and secondary literature reveals two key theological themes 
that inform Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice; namely liberation and ubuntu. While 
these theological concepts are definitely connected it is helpful to discuss them separately 
for the sake of clarity.  
 
2.2.1 Tutu‘s Liberation Theology 
 
In Tutu‘s authorised biography John Allen states quite clearly that Tutu‘s decision to 
enter ordained ministry was heavily influenced by the church/state confrontation over 
apartheid policies.
113
 This illustrates both Tutu‘s understanding of a God concerned about 
injustice and his faith in the ability of the church as an institution to oppose injustice. The 
seeds of this liberation theology would continue to germinate throughout Tutu‘s ministry.  
 
Two key texts articulate his liberation theology most clearly. The first is the sermon 
preached at Steve Biko‘s funeral in 1977 and the second is Tutu‘s inaugural sermon for 
his enthronement as Archbishop of Cape Town on 7 September 1986.    
 
In the Biko funeral sermon (25 September 1977) Tutu prefixes his liberation theology 
with a strong call for all to acknowledge their infinite worth as human beings created in 
God‘s image.114 He then goes on to talk of God of the exodus who is on the side of the 
oppressed and marginalised ―simply and solely because they were oppressed‖.115 God is 
portrayed as the liberator who delivered the Israelites from Egypt and who then, through 
Jesus released the people from the tyranny of Roman rule.  
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Tutu draws parallels between the revolutionary work of Jesus and the work begun by   
Biko;  
―Steve…realised that until blacks asserted their humanity and their personhood, 
there was not the remotest chance for reconciliation in South Africa. For true 
reconciliation is a deeply personal matter. It can happen only between persons 
who assert their own personhood and who acknowledge and respect that of 
others‖.116  
 
For Tutu liberation incorporates not only liberation from external injustice but also 
liberation from an internal condition of low self-worth. This kind of liberation works in 
tandem with the justice and goodness of God; 
 
―The powers of injustice, of oppression, of exploitation, have done their worst and 
they have lost. They have lost because they are immoral and wrong and our God, 
the God of the Exodus, the liberator God is a God of justice and liberation and 
goodness‖.117  
 
A further account of Tutu‘s liberation theology is found in his inaugural sermon on the 
occasion of his enthronement as Archbishop of Cape Town on 7 September 1986.
118
 He 
articulates his understanding of a liberation theology whereby God has a preferential 
option for the poor and oppressed. This God of the oppressed is involved in the reality of 
day to day living and the material or physical reality of human beings is a matter of 
concern for God. Tutu understands the incarnation of God in the human figure of Jesus as 
a call to ―be concerned about where people live, how they live, whether they have justice, 
whether they are uprooted and dumped as rubbish in resettlement camps…‖.119 Tutu 
emphasises that this concern is ―not because of our politics, but because of our 
religion‖.120 Similarly, in a 1979 address to the Anglican Provincial Synod explaining the 
South African Council of Churches‘ (SACC) political activities Tutu reiterates this 
sentiment and explains that faith in God and a living relationship with God necessitates 
involvement in the socio-political realm.
121
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Tutu‘s liberation theology sharpens his refusal to tolerate injustice and leads to the 
conviction that injustice is not only ethically wrong, but spiritually reprehensible. The 
prophetic tradition which filters into his liberation theology advocates a God who is 
actively concerned with injustice. The dominant school of Latin American liberation 
theology interprets both the prophetic tradition and Jesus‘ mission as a call to active 
resistance against injustice, even as a call to take up arms.
122
 Tutu‘s brand of liberation 
theology does not go this far, primarily due to his equally strong focus on a theology of 
ubuntu.  
 
2.2.2 Tutu‘s Ubuntu Theology 
 
Tutu‘s ubuntu theology has its roots in his liberation theology. Through the influence of 
Latin American liberation theology Tutu came to re-evaluate his own context and turned 
to African theology.
123
   African theology gives voice to Christianity that is not bound to 
a Western colonial framework and instead highlights the parallels between Christianity 
and an African worldview. According to Tutu, 
 ―the African would understand perfectly well what the Old Testament meant 
when it said ‗man belongs to the bundle of life,‘ that he is not a solitary 
individual. He is linked backwards to the ancestors whom he reveres and forward 
with all the generations yet unborn‖.124  
 
This continuity between biblical notions of interconnectedness and an African worldview 
served as Tutu‘s foundation for his ubuntu theology. There are substantial and significant 
lines of continuity in Tutu‘s ideas about ubuntu and human interconnectedness. The same 
key ideas are expressed in his 1984 Nobel Lecture, 1986 inaugural sermon and then in No 
Future Without Forgiveness (2000).  
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Tutu‘s1984 Nobel lecture contains three building blocks of his ubuntu theology. God‘s 
goal of community for humanity is one such building block:  
―God created us so that we should form the human family, existing together 
because we were made for one another. We are not made for an exclusive self-
sufficiency but for interdependence, and we break the law of our being at our 
peril‖.125  
 
Like the goal of liberation mentioned above (2.2.1), the goal of community also requires 
that all realise their infinite worth as created in the image of God. This second building 
block of a sound realisation of one‘s self-worth means that it is therefore tantamount to 
blasphemy to treat any one as less than that; 
―oppression dehumanises the oppressor as much, if not more than the oppressed. 
They need eachother to become truly free, to become human. We can be human 
only in fellowship, in community, in koinonia, in peace‖.126  
 
A third building block of Tutu‘s ubuntu theology is the notion of shalom or peace. Tutu 
asserts that there can be no peace without justice and suggests that this is a biblical tenet: 
 ―God‘s shalom, peace, involves inevitably righteousness, justice, wholeness, 
fullness of life, participation in decision-making, goodness, laughter, joy, 
compassion, sharing and reconciliation‖.127  
 
The text of Tutu‘s inaugural sermon as Archbishop of Cape Town (1986) reflects 
continuity in his thought around ubuntu. The notion of community is extended with 
Tutu‘s use of the family analogy to explain and legitimise the obligations that we have to 
one another. The notion of familial obligation is then extended to the imperative to  
 
―recognise our common humanity, that we do belong together, that our destinies 
are bound up with one another‘s, that we can be free only together, that we can 
survive only together, that we can be human only together‖.128  
 
Tutu explicitly refers to ubuntu and explains it as such:  
―It has to do with what it means to be truly human, it refers to gentleness, to 
compassion, to hospitality, to openness to others, to vulnerability, to be available 
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for others and to know that you are bound up with them in the bundle of life, for a 
person is only a person through other persons‖.129  
 
These key pillars of Tutu‘s ubuntu theology continued to develop during the years before 
the TRC. Tutu‘s autobiographical account of the TRC, No Future Without Forgiveness 
(2000) displays very close parallels with his earlier writings on ubuntu. He repeats the 
formulation that ubuntu captures the ―very essence of being human‖ and connotes 
generosity, hospitality and compassion.
130
 Similarly he again associates ubuntu with a 
deep sense of human interconnectedness that means that all are affected by injustice and 
oppression of others.
131
  
 
Tutu‘s account of ubuntu in No Future Without Forgiveness does take on a stronger tone 
than his earlier accounts. This is due to the manner in which Tutu employs ubuntu as a 
way of justifying the conditional amnesty offered by the TRC. He suggests that the 
TRC‘s brand of conditional amnesty ―was consistent with a central feature of the African 
Weltanschauung – what we know in our languages as ubuntu‖.132 In an article written in 
2004 Tutu boldly affirms that: 
 
―We have had a jurisprudence, a penology in Africa that was not retributive but 
restorative. Traditionally, when people quarreled the main intention was not to 
punish the miscreant but to restore good relations. This was the animating principle 
of our Truth and Reconciliation Commission. For Africa is concerned, or has 
traditionally been concerned, about the wholeness of relationships‖.133 
 
A very similar explanation is offered in No Future Without Forgiveness, Tutu explains  
ubuntu and shows that it accounts for why ―so many chose to forgive rather than demand 
retribution, to be so magnanimous and ready to forgive rather than wreak revenge‖.134 He 
talks about the pursuit of the common good and how this should supersede ―anger, 
resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness‖.135 
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Ultimately Tutu‘s understanding of ubuntu suggests that ―to forgive is not just to be 
altruistic. It is the best form of self-interest‖.136  
 
Tutu suggests that the TRC‘s conditional amnesty was well received by black South 
Africans due to the parallels with the notion of ubuntu, which according to him is very 
much a part of the African worldview. In a later chapter in No Future Without 
Forgiveness Tutu expresses similar sentiments regarding the notion of human 
interconnectedness and the attendant obligations that this interconnectedness carries. 
However, in this instance Tutu does not make reference to ubuntu but to universal ―moral 
laws‖ that have a distinct biblical undertone: 
―One such law is that we are bound together in what the Bible calls ‗the bundle of 
life‘. Our humanity is caught up in that of all others. We are human because we 
belong. We are made for community, for togetherness, for family, to exist in a 
delicate network of interdependence‖.137  
 
According to Tutu, apartheid‘s enforced segregation amounted to South Africans living 
in a situation in which the moral law of interconnectedness was contravened. Thus for 
Tutu victims, perpetrators, beneficiaries and dissenters have all suffered an injury to their 
humanity or personhood. It is against this backdrop that Tutu articulates the task of the 
TRC as one of healing.
138
  
 
In the epilogue to Rabble Rouser for Peace, Allen admires Tutu‘s ubuntu theology noting 
that, ―In his formulation, ubuntu-botho equips you to look at your torturers, to realize that 
they need your help and to stand ready to enable them to regain their humanity‖.139 Allen 
admits that this approach is counter-intuitive for most people, but it ultimately trumps 
other approaches to justice because it ―empowers the survivors of torture, for it enables 
them to take control of their lives, to take initiatives instead of remaining trapped in 
victimhood,‖.140       
 
                                                 
136
 Ibid.  
137
 No Future, 196. See also Tutu‘s Nobel Address 1984 as cited in The Rainbow People of God, 91.  
138
 No Future, 197-198.  
139
 Rabble Rouser, 396.  
140
 Ibid., 396.  
U
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
55 
 
He goes on to make the connection between Tutu‘s ubuntu theology and the Christian 
notion of forgiveness; 
 
 ―Thus ubuntu-botho gives contemporary, practical meaning to God‘s forgiveness 
of the people of Israel recorded by the prophet Hosea, and to Christ‘s words from 
the Cross: ‗Forgive them Father, they know not what they do‘. But ubuntu-botho 
does not allow perpetrators to escape the necessity of confessing and making 
restitution to survivors, since it places the needs of society – the restoration of 
relationship – at the heart of reconciliation‖.141 
 
 
The combination of Tutu‘s theologies of liberation and ubuntu provide a fertile 
foundation to further explore Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice.  
 
 
2.3 Key Elements of Tutu‘s Conception of Restorative Justice 
 
The theological concepts of liberation and ubuntu are manifest in certain tangible 
elements of Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice. It has been difficult to tease out 
defined distinctions between Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice and his notion of 
reconciliation. In many instances in the literature the two concepts are used 
interchangeably and show substantial overlaps. Tutu clearly states that ―justice, peace and 
reconciliation‖ are for him the ultimate goals of transitional justice.142 However these 
three goals are not placed on the same level. Tutu places reconciliation as the primary 
goal with restorative justice as the best strategy for achieving this goal. Peace, largely 
conceived of as the absence of violence, is for Tutu a prerequisite for entering into a 
restorative justice process.       
 
In No Future Without Forgiveness Tutu defines restorative justice as consistent with 
―traditional African jurisprudence‖ where 
 ―the central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the 
restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and 
                                                 
141
 Ibid., 396.  
142
 ―Moral Reflections‖, 6.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
56 
 
the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the 
community he has injured by his offense‖.143  
 
Tutu goes on to define restorative justice as encompassing healing, forgiving and 
reconciliation.
144
 In our reading we have identified further aspects of his notion of 
restorative justice: 
- Reliance on a restorative / retributive dichotomy.  
- Reconciliation is seen as a primary goal of restorative justice. 
- Public confession is a necessary prerequisite for a restorative justice process. 
- Both the victim and the perpetrator are harmed by the crime. 
- Reparation and restitution must be made by the perpetrator. 
- Forgiveness as means of catharsis for both victim and perpetrator.  
- Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice acknowledges the potentially cyclical 
nature of gross injustice. 
- Healing for the victim and perpetrator is the outcome of restorative justice.   
 
Restorative / retributive dichotomy 
When Tutu does explicitly mention ―restorative justice‖ he often does so by making an 
antithetical reference to retributive justice. While this distinction is not uncommon in the 
criminal justice literature, Tutu‘s dichotomy is problematic because he offers a confused 
and ambiguous definition of retributive justice.
145
   
 
He suggests that one of the key differences between restorative and retributive justice 
models is that the victim is the wronged party, not the state.
146
 This is indeed the case 
with most restorative justice practices within the criminal justice domain as will be 
shown in the next chapter; but this is not necessarily the case with the amnesty offered by 
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the TRC, which Tutu clearly identifies as an example of restorative justice.  In fact, it is 
far from clear whether amnesty ought to be classified as a restorative justice practice.
147
   
 
David A. Crocker problematises Tutu‘s take on retribution arguing that Tutu‘s logic is 
flawed.
148
 According to Crocker Tutu bases his argument against vengeance on three 
premises; i) punishment is retribution, ii) retribution is vengeance, and iii) vengeance is 
morally wrong. Crocker finds that both premise i and ii are flawed.   
 
In terms of premise i Crocker finds that Tutu commits himself to two contradictory 
approaches to punishment. On the one hand Tutu rejects punishment as it represents 
retributive justice ―whose chief goal is to be punitive, so that the wronged party is really 
the state, something impersonal, which has little consideration for the real victims and 
almost none for the perpetrator‖.149 But on the other hand, he affirms the efficacy of the 
potential threat of legal punishment, noting that perpetrators have a good incentive to 
apply for amnesty so as to avoid the threat of punishment. Tutu also affirms the 
legitimacy of legal punishment as a constitutional right of all victims.
150
 Crocker argues 
that Tutu is wholly misguided in his understanding of retribution because he does not 
―understand retribution as one important rationale or justification for and a constraint 
upon punishment‖.151  
 
As will be shown in the next chapter on Criminal Justice conceptions of restorative 
justice; reactions to the short-comings of the retributive model have significantly 
informed restorative justice theory. Within transitional justice literature, the critics of 
restorative justice argue that retributive theory is not properly understood by restorative 
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justice proponents. Given Crocker‘s critique of Tutu‘s notion of retribution we need to 
ask whether Tutu‘s contradictory understanding of retribution discredits his overall 
conception of restorative justice.    
 
Reconciliation as a primary goal of restorative justice 
Tutu‘s designation of reconciliation as a goal of transitional justice is not controversial in 
itself, it becomes problematic when the notion of reconciliation is explained in Christian 
terms as a biblical concept and then transferred to transitional justice contexts. It is 
perhaps Tutu‘s belief that religion can and should speak to politics that explains his 
readiness to transfer the biblical notion of reconciliation to secular transitional justice 
contexts.  
 
After the release of Nelson Mandela from prison a major ecumenical conference was held 
in Rustenburg to chart the way forward for the church in South Africa (November 1990).  
In the opening address to the conference Tutu outlined his vision of how reconciliation 
ought to be achieved in South Africa.
152
 The first step in the process of reconciliation 
requires confession from all those responsible for apartheid. The kind of confession 
envisaged by Tutu involves an expression of remorse and a plea for forgiveness. This 
preference is evident in many of the TRC victims‘ hearings in which Tutu pushed 
perpetrators to ask for forgiveness, even though remorse was not one of the requirements 
for amnesty.  In the 1990 Rustenburg address Tutu does not make reference to 
beneficiaries only to those who literally ‗gave orders‘. Later, during and after the TRC he 
extends this call for confession to all white South Africans who benefited from the unjust 
status quo.
153
 The second step requires that the victims forgive the perpetrators as part of 
a ―gospel imperative‖.154 The idea of a ―gospel imperative‖ to forgive is clearly not an 
appropriate motivation to offer victims of human rights violations. The context of this 
statement was a religious gathering and Tutu refrained from using this kind of explicit 
language during the TRC victims‘ hearings. Finally the third step requires that the 
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perpetrators make restitution to the victims; since according to Tutu sincere repentance 
necessitates restitution.  
 
Tutu has applied this explicitly Christian model of reconciliation in contexts that are 
either secular or of other faith groups; in the South African TRC, post-genocide Rwanda, 
Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine.
155
 The role of religion in transitional justice is 
itself a wide area of debate. For our current purposes our immediate concern is rather 
with Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice. We have already noted the porous lines 
between Tutu‘s notions of restorative justice and reconciliation. Keeping this in mind it is 
nonetheless possible to pinpoint certain elements of Tutu‘s brand of restorative justice 
that may not be dependent upon his theological notion of reconciliation.  
 
Public Confession 
As discussed above Tutu suggests that reconciliation is only possible if the perpetrator 
makes a full confession of the crime. The TRC amnesty requirements did not include an 
expression of remorse; but full disclosure, evidence that the crime was politically 
motivated, and proof that the principle of proportionality was maintained.
156
 Tutu affirms 
the amnesty committee‘s decision but nonetheless encourages remorse, confession and 
apology from perpetrators.
157
 Tutu locates the TRC‘s precedent value in that the 
Commission held ―public hearings for victims in a belief that public truth, through its 
delivery of both knowledge and acknowledgement, serves as a form of justice in and of 
itself‖.158 For Tutu the public disclosure required by the Amnesty Committee entails a 
form of public humiliation which in turn is a form of penalty and punishment.
159
 This line 
of thinking reappears in Chapter 4 of this minor dissertation when we look at the 
mechanisms of Gacaca and Mato Oput.  
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 See Allen‘s account of Tutu‘s diplomatic efforts in Rabble Rouser, 374-389.  
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 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34, 26 July 1995. Available online at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm. [Accessed 24 January 2007].  
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Both the victim and the perpetrator are harmed by a crime 
A key strand of Tutu‘s thought acknowledges that the harm caused by a crime affects 
both the victim and the perpetrator. Allen notes Tutu‘s observation upon returning to 
South Africa from London in 1984, ―in many ways it was whites who needed to hear this 
message of self-assurance and self-acceptance, that oppression dehumanized the 
oppressor as much as, if not more than, the oppressed‖.160   
 
While Allen reports this kind of sentiment taking root in Tutu‘s thought as early as 1984, 
Graybill suggests a later period, namely after the TRC. She identifies a slight shift in 
Tutu‘s thinking arguing that during apartheid Tutu ―had articulated God‘s preferential 
option for the oppressed‖ she then goes on to note ―recently he has preached something 
akin to a preferential option of the former oppressor, for Tutu now views the former 
oppressor as a victim in need of healing‖.161 What could be argued as a misinterpretation 
on Graybill‘s part is worth some discussion as this is a central part of Tutu‘s theology and 
conception of justice. In making this assertion Graybill refers to a particular section of 
text in No Future Without Forgiveness (p.p.83-84). In the section Tutu is speaking about 
the relevance of theology for the commission. Tutu reiterates the same school of theology 
as he did in the early 1970s affirming that; 
―This is a moral universe …the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is proof 
positive that love is stronger than hate, that life is stronger than death, that light 
is stronger than darkness, that laughter and joy, and compassion and gentleness 
and truth, all these are so much stronger than their ghastly counterparts‖.162     
 
Tutu explains that this theological outlook led him to distinguish between the perpetrator 
and the crime for two specific reasons. First, Tutu argues that writing somebody off as a 
monster jeopardises any claim for accountability ―because we were then declaring that 
they were not moral agents‖.163 And second, Tutu‘s theology holds that all human beings 
are capable of change and are never beyond redemption.
164
 So what Graybill identifies as 
a shift in Tutu‘s thought is in fact consistent with his earlier work.     
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Reparation and Restitution  
In Tutu‘s Rustenburg address (1990) he clearly states that ―those who have wronged must 
be ready to make amends. They must be ready to make restitution and reparation‖.165 His 
formula for reconciliation as expressed at Rustenburg and throughout the TRC 
incorporates reparation from the perpetrator as an act of both of sincere remorse and of 
gratitude for the forgiveness offered by the victim.  
 
In an interview conducted during the TRC (1997) Tutu acknowledges the impossibility of 
compensating a victim fully and restoring the status quo ex ante. He suggests that through 
reparation ―the nation acknowledges that something wrong was done‖ and while the 
actual price tag is perhaps more symbolic than an actual compensation, this is an 
important part of national reconciliation. In the same interview and on various other 
occasions Tutu has also lobbied for a wealth tax to be paid by all apartheid beneficiaries, 
particularly businesses.
166
   
 
Forgiveness 
Forgiveness is for Tutu extraordinary and miraculous; yet the only way for victims to 
move forward, and for perpetrators to be motivated to seek redemption. The title of 
Tutu‘s autobiographical account neatly captures the cost of not forgiving, No Future 
Without Forgiveness.
167
 
 
Tutu‘s response to the question posed in Simon Wiesenthal‘s The Sunflower reflects his 
faith in the positive effects of forgiveness. Wiesenthal tells the story of being a prisoner 
in a Nazi concentration camp and being led to the bedside of a dying SS soldier. The 
soldier asks for Wiesenthal‘s forgiveness for his crimes. Wiesenthal refuses and then 
poses the question to the reader. 
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 This was a TRC recommendation (ref report). Although this has not been instituted Tutu still lobbies for 
it; ―Turning the Other Cheek‖ by Sheena Adams, Saturday Star, p.15, April 8 2006.  
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In answering Wiesenthal‘s question Tutu alludes to two examples. Firstly to victims who 
forgave perpetrators during the TRC and secondly to Nelson Mandela‘s lack of bitterness 
after twenty seven years in prison. He marvels at these examples and recommends 
forgiveness. Throughout the TRC Tutu ―singled out witnesses who embraced forgiveness 
and made their stories his leitmotif‖.168 In his response in the Sunflower Tutu suggests 
that the forgiveness option offers an alternate form of justice that has illustrated its 
strength during the TRC; ―It is clear that if we look only to retributive justice, then we 
could just as well close up shop‖.169 
 
A further interesting point regarding Tutu‘s notion of forgiveness is his suggestion that 
the perpetrator needn‘t express remorse in order for the victim to forgive. ―If the victim 
could forgive only when the culprit confessed, then the victim would be locked into 
victimhood, no matter her own attitude or intention. That would be palpably unjust‖.170 
This statement offers no explanation as to the important questions around the conditions 
for forgiveness and in what instance forgiveness can be said to be deserved.  
 
There is a vast body of literature that deals with the many dilemmas posed by the notion 
of forgiveness.
171
 Unfortunately Tutu does not engage in any of these dilemmas and 
appears to make prescriptive claims about victims‘ obligations to forgive and what he 
sees as the positive consequences thereof. The implication of this is that Tutu‘s notion of 
forgiveness could indeed be classified as ‗cheap‘. This charge of proposing ‗cheap 
forgiveness‘ may well apply to the manner in which Tutu extracted an apparently 
insincere apology from Winnie Madikizela Mandela. Reflecting on how Tutu dealt with 
Madikizela Mandela‘s testimony before the TRC, Alex Boraine expresses his concern 
regarding the insincere confession and apology that Tutu eventually managed to force 
from Madikizela Mandela.
172
 Boraine notes Tutu‘s sincere intentions but admits that 
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―Tutu‘s impassioned plea was that of a pastor rather than a secular commissioner‖.173 
Boraine‘s observation rings true for Tutu‘s conception of forgiveness and perhaps for his 
entire conception of restorative justice.  
 
Acknowledges the potentially cyclical nature of gross injustice 
Tutu‘s call for forgiveness is premised on the understanding that without ‗dealing with 
the past‘ one is caught in a cycle of retaliation. In a letter to P.W.Botha in 1979, then 
Prime Minister of South Africa, Tutu warns that: 
 
―The Afrikaner has found it difficult to forget the concentration camps in which 
some of his forebears were incarcerated by the British. Black memories of the 
resettlement camps and villages may be equally indelible‖.174   
 
Tutu employed a similar logic in trying to persuade white Afrikaner beneficiaries to 
participate in the TRC process. After visiting a memorial for Afrikaner women and 
children who were killed in concentration camps during the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) 
Tutu is reported as commenting that ―the legacy of bitterness between Afrikaans and 
English speaking South Africans left by the camps could have been avoided if there had 
been a similar process a century earlier‖.175 On a visit to post-genocide Rwanda in 1995 
Tutu preached a sermon describing the history of Rwanda as ―‗top dog‘ and ‗underdog‘‖ 
with the implication of ―reprisal and counterreprisal‖.176 He preached that the only way to 
break this cycle ―was to go beyond retributive justice to restorative justice, to move on to 
forgiveness, because without it there was no future‖.177  
 
Healing 
Tutu designates the kind of justice pursued by the TRC as ―moral justice‖.178 This ―moral 
justice‖ differs from the prevailing retributive paradigm and instead ―acknowledges the 
way in which each of us is inextricably bound to the other and where only the restoration 
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and respect of this relationship will allow us to move forward, together‖.179 For Tutu 
restorative justice recognises that relationships need to be restored after a crime and that 
healing is required; ―For retribution wounds and divides us from one another. Only 
restoration can heal us and make us whole‖.180 
 
2.4 Relevance and Significance of Tutu‘s Conception of Restorative Justice for 
Transitional Justice 
 
Archbishop Tutu‘s role as chairperson of the TRC has been praised as exemplifying a 
model example of reconciliation and restorative justice. Ranging from co-chairperson 
Alex Boraine to journalist Antjie Krog, to TRC Human Rights Violations Committee 
member Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela Tutu‘s role has been praised and deemed 
indispensable to the process.
181
 These and the majority of other references to Tutu take an 
anecdotal form drawing more on his persona than his writings. This chapter has focussed 
more on the latter, with the overarching aim being to interrogate Tutu‘s conception of 
restorative justice. What has emerged through this chapter is that there is a discernable 
conception of restorative justice that is developed by Tutu. This conception is tightly 
bound up with his theology.  
 
The transitional justice framework that was developed in the previous chapter can 
provide a helpful grid to assess the relevance and contribution of Tutu‘s conception of 
restorative justice. The five aspects of the framework concern the notion of a society 
judging itself, that transitional justice be a self-limiting endeavour, that it be responsive to 
the needs of different actors (perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries), that it be realistic and 
feasible within given constraints, and that there be dual aims of acknowledgement and 
accountability.  
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There are perhaps three aspects of the framework where Tutu‘s conception of restorative 
justice may hold some purchase. Certainly Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice is 
responsive to the needs of perpetrators, victims and maybe even beneficiaries. For Tutu 
both the victim and the perpetrator are harmed by the crime. Furthermore, for Tutu 
forgiveness is a means of catharsis for both victim and perpetrator and healing for the 
victim and perpetrator is the outcome of restorative justice.  Similarly, Tutu‘s conception 
of restorative justice does promote the dual aims of acknowledgement and accountability. 
This is apparent through his stress on the perpetrator making reparation and restitution to 
the victim. The third aspect of the framework is as regards the society judging itself. 
Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice does hint at this by placing emphasis on public 
confession as necessary prerequisites for restorative justice.  
 
Both the TRC report and Tutu‘s post TRC writings advance a misguided approach by 
suggesting that a restorative understanding of justice allows for a coherent connection 
between amnesty and justice.
182
 While it is plausible to argue for connections between the 
values of restorative justice, conditional amnesty and reconciliation, it is problematic and 
misguided to equate restorative justice with either amnesty or reconciliation.
183
 The 
problem with this connection is that the report positions amnesty as a tool of restorative 
justice rather than as a consequence of the negotiated settlement.   
 
It is our contention that for Tutu justice is not a final or absolute principle (as it might be 
for human rights theorists) but rather that it is a secondary value in relation to the goal of 
reconciliation. Reconciliation is seen as a primary goal of restorative justice. Given the 
other competing aims of transitional justice like accountability and acknowledgement, it 
may be questionable the extent to which Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice is 
directly applicable.  
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Chapter Three 
Criminal Justice Conceptions of Restorative Justice 
 
This chapter looks at the conceptions of restorative justice that have emerged within the 
field of criminal justice. Locating this discussion within the field of criminal justice may 
appear confusing especially from a transitional justice perspective as advocates of 
restorative justice typically present the notion of restorative justice as a departure from 
the conventional criminal justice framework. So to suggest that formulations of an 
alternative approach to criminal justice be discussed within the very framework that it is 
trying to critique may seem paradoxical.
184
  
 
However, the fact is that, unbeknownst to those critics of ―the criminal justice model‖ 
who have been propagating the alternative conception of restorative justice within the 
field of transitional justice, an important set of developments in just these terms have in 
recent decades also been taking place within the field of criminal justice itself. To date 
the discussion of restorative justice within the field of transitional justice has not 
sufficiently been informed by the analogous debates on restorative justice within the field 
of criminal justice with which this chapter will deal. In a sense this is counter-intuitive 
since one might expect the transitional justice advocates of restorative justice to be alert 
to the important developments under this very rubric in a related field. But the fact of the 
matter is that the two sets of developments using this rubric by and large proceeded 
unbeknownst to each other. Some of the important recent accounts of the emergence of 
transitional justice as a sub-field feature little or no references to the development of 
notions of restorative justice in the criminal justice field. The result is that the typical 
transitional justice critiques of the ―criminal justice model‖ are to some extent aimed at a 
straw man. It is this state of affairs that forms the main justification for this chapter.  
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Therefore, the task of this chapter is to explore what restorative justice has come to mean 
within the field of criminal justice itself. This chapter commences with a brief genealogy 
of the modern criminal justice model both in relation to traditional and more informal 
practices of dispute settlement, on the one hand, as well as with regard to the relation of 
the criminal justice system to criminal law and criminology, on the other hand. We then 
turn to a fuller discussion of the genealogy and theoretical foundations of the new and 
alternative conceptions of restorative justice. This is followed by a discussion of three 
conceptions of restorative justice. In conclusion, we make some remarks on the relevance 
of restorative justice, both in the criminal justice context itself and in relation to 
transitional justice. 
 
 
3.1 The Modern Criminal Justice Model - Criminal law, the Criminal justice system and 
Criminology  
 
The dominant criminal justice model is a distinctively modern construct. Historically as 
well as in comparative cultural terms criminal justice and dispute resolution have by no 
means always been synonymous with criminal law, adversarial prosecution and 
retributive justice. Jerold Auerbach‘s text Justice Without Law? offers a significant 
account of how informal justice functioned historically; 
―express[ing] an ideology of communitarian justice without formal law, an 
equitable process based on reciprocal access and trust among community 
members…Sharing a suspicion of law and lawyers, they developed patterns of 
conflict resolution that reflected their common striving for social harmony beyond 
individual conflict, for justice without law‖.185  
 
Throughout his book, Auerbach highlights examples of informal justice from the 
seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. He refers to Western examples of informal justice 
that ―illuminate broad historical patterns that demonstrate how the process of dispute 
settlement expresses personal choices and, most significantly, cultural values‖.186  
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The modern criminal justice model was an achievement of the 18
th
 century 
Enlightenment associated with such reformers as Cesare Beccaria.
187
 At a conceptual 
level the modern criminal justice model involved the development of the basic notions of 
separation of powers, individual rights, due process, the distinction of criminal and civil 
law and the ideal of the rule of law; at a practical level it involved the abolition of torture 
and of the requirement of confessions, significant processes of prison reform, elaboration 
of the penal code as well as of the adversarial system of criminal prosecution.
188
 By the 
20
th
 century, this modern criminal justice model had achieved such hegemony in the 
West that to many it had become synonymous with criminal justice itself. From its 
perspective, the earlier historical practices of informal communal justice now appeared as 
primitive and arbitrary conflations of popular justice without proper criminal law and 
procedure. Criminal justice had come to mean formalised due process and adversarial 
prosecution in state courts. However, it was precisely in response to key assumptions and 
features of this criminal justice model that the ―restorative justice‖ critique and 
movement arose in recent decades within the criminal justice field itself. 
 
The modern criminal justice model may be described in terms of three main components, 
that of criminal law, the criminal justice system and criminology as three interrelated 
spheres. The first component, that of criminal law, is concerned with the legal 
construction of crime by the state as distinct from civil law which, by contrast, is 
concerned with wrongs between individual citizens. ―Criminal law is concerned with 
offences that threaten the public, is developed and enforced by the state, imposes 
sanctions that range from fines and imprisonment to death, and requires a standard of 
proof ‗beyond a reasonable doubt‘‖.189 Because crimes have the potential to harm the 
broader public, the state, as the guardian of the public interest, has a legitimate stake in 
the criminal justice process; hence prosecution is pursued by the state on behalf of the 
harmed victim. This view of crime as a violation against the state follows from a notion 
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of crime in relation to the law and as a violation of rights. In this light, criminal justice 
primarily concerns the relation between offender and the state. Civil law by contrast 
―refers to the body of laws governing disputes between individuals, as opposed to those 
governing offences that are public and relate to the government‖.190 
 
The second component, that of the criminal justice system, itself consists of different 
institutional sectors, respectively those of the police, the courts and the correctional 
system. Significantly each of these three components of the criminal justice system 
(police, courts and correctional system) are coercive and ultimately embody an 
adversarial and punitive approach in dealing with crime.
191
 The criminal justice system as   
field of study for criminal justice studies is then concerned with the ―institutional aspects 
of the social construction of crime: with criminal processes such as policing, prosecution, 
plea bargaining, sentencing and punishment‖.192  
 
Criminology differs from criminal justice studies in that it is less concerned with the 
institutional aspects of crime and not necessarily limited to the assumptions and 
perspectives of the criminal justice model. As an academic discipline, criminology has 
not been restricted to the legal construction of crime only. Lacey notes the key 
distinguishing mark between criminology and criminal justice studies as well as criminal 
law in the social (or extra-legal) constructions of crime by criminology compared to its 
legal construction by criminal law and criminal justice studies.
193
  Accordingly 
criminology has been prepared to utilise a wider range of perspectives and sources 
including those of sociology, social anthropology, social theory, psychology, history and, 
though more rarely, economics and political science.
194
  This has given rise to significant 
methodological variation and different theoretical perspectives within the field of 
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criminology, including those between ―consensus‖ and ―conflict‖ theories.195 There is 
divergence concerning the ―causes of crime, the most effective methods of responding to 
crime, and even the definition and nature of crime‖.196 Nevertheless, mainstream 
criminology typically still tends to assume the modern criminal justice model while the 
key focus of criminology remains on individual offenders and their behaviour implying 
―a legalistic view of crime, seeing it as a violation of consensually generated legal 
statutes‖.197  
 
A remaining aspect of this discussion concerns questions around the conceptualisation of 
justice at play in the modern criminal justice model. It can be argued that the modern 
criminal justice model (comprising the three components of criminal law, the criminal 
justice system and criminology) involves a certain conceptualisation of justice that hinges 
on a variation of the basic concept of retributive justice. The idea of retributivism is 
expressed in the concept of lex talionis – the law of retaliation or ―an eye for an eye, an 
ear for an ear‖: as articulated in ancient Near Eastern law codes with the accompanying 
notion of retribution entailing proportional punishment for wrong doing
198
. From the 
perspective of modern criminal justice the lex talionis principle in the context of 
communal justice practices would be regarded as equivalent to the idea of vengeance, 
unless legally constructed in terms of separation of powers, due process and the rule of 
law. So while the modern criminal justice model may employ a slightly different notion 
of retribution, the origins of retribution lie in the ancient principle of lex talionis.  
 
Linked to this retributive conception of justice is the role and significance of punishment 
in criminal justice. Generally, there are two widely recognised justifications for 
punishment: as (proportionate) retribution for wrong-doing, as prevention of further 
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wrong doing through deterrence.
199
  In addition to these two arguments there is also an 
argument from an ethical standpoint by invoking theories of retribution whereby 
punishment facilitates a method of asserting the fundamental worth of human beings.
200
 
On this line of thinking calls for prosecution and punishment are healthy responses by 
victims seeking to re-establish their human and civic dignity.
201
 These different 
justifications for punishment illustrate that while the criminal justice model involves the 
concept of retributive justice, punishment has not been exclusively conceived in 
retributivist terms. Moreover, it could be contended that there may well be connections 
between the non-retributivist justifications for punishment and the emergence of notions 
of restorative justice.  The emergence of non-retributivist notions of punishment being 
applied to the very concept of justice marks a defining point in the development of the 
criminal justice field. And it is precisely in terms of these retributive / non-retributive 
respects that restorative justice notions depart most significantly from the modern 
criminal justice model, as we will see in the sub-sections that follow.  
                                                                                                                                              
3.2 Restorative Justice as an Alternative Conceptualisation of Criminal Justice 
 
With the above brief description of the modern criminal justice model as a backdrop it is 
possible to explore how ―restorative justice‖ has been conceived as an alternative 
approach to criminal justice. Restorative justice has largely developed in reaction to, and 
as an alternative of, standard notions of criminal justice that are centred on notions of 
retributivism.  
 
The restorative justice movement responded to key features and assumptions of the 
modern criminal justice model. In general this reflected a growing awareness of the 
limitations of the conventional criminal justice system. The problems or limitations 
identified were of both a practical and conceptual nature. Much of the development of 
restorative justice as a field has been shaped by practical considerations. And most of the 
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writings on the subject are authored by practitioners from non-governmental and 
community based organisations. At the same time, and taken together, they also 
amounted to a comprehensive re-conceptualisation of the criminal justice model itself as 
not necessarily involving retributive justice but rather an alternative conception of 
restorative justice. For our purposes it is this re-conceptualisation of criminal justice as 
restorative justice, rather than the specific details and ramifications of the various 
practical considerations, which is of central significance. Accordingly, we must first 
attempt to outline the key features of this re-conceptualisation. 
 
 These approaches and assumptions involved in the general re-conceptualisation broadly 
concern the focus, process and outcome of criminal justice.
202
 The following discussion is 
descriptive and deliberately does not offer critical analysis; it simply sets the scene for the 
fuller discussion of different conceptions of restorative justice, which is to follow in 
section three of this chapter.  
 
Focus:  
As discussed above, the legal construction of crime in the modern criminal justice model 
conceives of it as the violation of rules and laws rather than as a personal interaction or a 
communal event. Criminal justice is not a matter for personal or popular retribution but 
properly the state has to act as the prosecutor of those charged of criminal violations that 
can harm the public. It follows that conventional criminal justice is essentially offender-
focused. Criminal prosecution and due process are structured around proving the guilt or 
innocence of the offender as charged. Victims or other parties affected by the crime can 
only enter the legal proceedings in relation to this central focus on prosecuting the 
offender.  
 
Restorative justice proponents have responded by offering a different understanding of 
crime and hence of the focus of the criminal justice process. At the heart of the 
restorative justice rationale is the contention that crime involves a violation in relations 
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between people rather than a violation between the offender and the state.
203
 So 
addressing crime, when conceived in this way, means that those affected need to be 
central to the process. The direct stakeholders are the victim, the offender and the 
affected communities comprising of the families of the victim and offender and other 
community members. Instead of focusing narrowly on the offender‘s alleged guilt for his 
criminal actions; restorative justice is more concerned with the after-effects of the 
offender‘s action, for the victim as well as the offender and the wider community.204 
Restorative justice advocates thus extend the specific focus on crime to a wider set of 
after-effects as ―social harm‖.205 
 
The criminal justice focus on the rules of evidence to prove criminal liability are adapted 
by restorative justice advocates so as to facilitate the personal encounter between the 
offender and the victim intended to allow for the victim to explain how the crime has 
affected him or her and this in turn encourages the offender to take responsibility for his 
or her actions and ask apology. 
 
Process: 
The modern criminal justice model is characterised by a distinctly adversarial process 
which focuses on the offender and the state. The historical roots of this adversarial 
system can be traced back to so-called divine adjudication with a litigant required to 
defend his or her case before God with the help of confirmatory oaths uttered by 
―compurgators‖.206 It was believed that if the compurgator was able to make the oath 
without stumbling this indicated the oath‘s validity. The religious or superstitious origins 
of this adversarial system have subsequently been replaced by consequentialist and non-
consequentialist arguments. The former motivating for the adversarial system due to its 
ability to establish the truth, protect individual‘s legal rights and safeguard against 
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unfairness.
207
 The non-consequentialist arguments suggest that the lawyer-client 
relationship is valuable and that the dignity of individuals is upheld through affording 
legal representation.
208
 This adversarial dynamic is embodied in key principles like the 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty, the right to legal representation, the 
separate functions of judge, prosecution and counsel for the defence.  
 
In restorative justice processes the adversarial system employed in criminal prosecutions 
is rejected in favour of a non-adversarial approach that places the victim as the main 
protagonist. Restorative justice processes take many different forms. However, common 
to all variations is a drive to encourage more active participation from the victim, 
offender and relevant community stakeholders. Furthermore, protagonists of restorative 
justice contest the dominance of legal professionals in the criminal justice process and 
much has been written about the alienating impact that these professionals have on the 
victim and offender.
209
 This brings to the fore the whole issue of the right to legal 
representation. It seems that restorative justice considers the need for direct participation 
of the stakeholders to take precedence over the right to legal representation. While there 
are variations in terms of process, the central aim from a restorative justice perspective is 
that victims ought to be able to ask questions of the offender directly and should not have 
to use the medium of legal professionals. In terms of offender participation restorative 
justice reacts to criminal justice processes that discourage the offender from taking 
responsibility for her actions.
210
 Restorative justice proponents also raise concerns 
regarding the high financial cost of criminal trials due to the involvement of legal 
professionals and motivate for restorative justice mechanisms on the grounds of such 
pragmatic concerns.
211
 
 
Restorative justice processes normally commence from the point of an admission of guilt 
by the offender, so the process is not aimed at establishing culpability but more about 
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how to deal with the effects of the wrongdoing. This breaks with the fundamental 
principle of the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It is important to note that 
there are variations of restorative justice practices with accompanying variations in terms 
of process.
212
  
 
Outcomes: 
As its name suggests the restorative justice approach aims for restoration as one of its key 
outcomes, while such restoration should be socially oriented rather than only offender-
focused. For restorative justice advocates the outcome of the justice process ought to be 
less about establishing guilt and then punishing the guilty party and more about helping 
the offender to understand the consequences of her action and restore relations with the 
victim and the community.
213
 Within the modern criminal justice framework the 
Correctional System is focussed on meting out some form of punitive sanction to 
convicted offenders as well as facilitating a measure of rehabilitation. The offender is 
removed from society and not under any obligation to make compensation to the victim 
or acknowledge his or her guilt to the victim. Restorative justice views this as a missed 
opportunity and advocates an outcome that repairs the harm caused by the crime both for 
the victim and the offender as well as the wider community.  
 
 
3.3 Genealogy of Restorative Justice within the Field of Criminal Justice 
 
The term ‗restorative justice‘ is believed to have been coined by Albert Eglash at the First 
International Symposium on Restitution in 1975. He used the term to refer to a type of 
criminal justice that focused on the harmful effects of offenders‘ actions and actively 
involved victims and offenders in the process of restitution and rehabilitation.
214
 Eglash 
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was not alone in articulating a growing frustration and dissatisfaction with the 
conventional criminal justice framework. From the mid 1970s a notable search for 
alternatives to the existing criminal justice framework emerged.
215
 This search for 
alternatives was based within the existing criminal justice system and included other 
fields of inquiry including informal justice, restitution, the victims‘ movement, mediation 
and social justice.
216
 These emerging voices were predominantly from North American 
academic and civil society institutions with a few key figures in Western Europe and the 
United Kingdom. In the course of the late 1980s and 1990s their influence spread to 
Australia and New Zealand.
217
 By the late 1990s academics and civil society practitioners 
from Australia, New Zealand, England, Canada, North America, Western Europe and 
South Africa had become familiar with restorative justice as a relevant newcomer.
218
  
 
To a considerable extent the critiques of the conventional criminal justice system and the 
growing interest in alternative forms of restorative justice were driven by practical 
considerations. The high financial costs of the conventional approach to crime fell under 
growing scrutiny.
219
 There was growing concern with the high rate of prisoners awaiting 
trial and with the ever increasing overcrowding in prisons as well as the high rates of 
recidivism. But the significance of the restorative justice movement was not limited to 
practical proposals. On a normative and conceptual level it involved basic challenges to, 
and alternative conceptualisations of, key features of the modern criminal justice model. 
Thus fundamental concerns were raised regarding the peripheral and passive role 
afforded to victims in criminal proceedings, the predominant role of the state, the narrow 
understanding of crime and the efficacy of punishment as a form of deterrence or 
sanction. Legal anthropologists levelled critique at the conventional criminal justice 
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system for its overly professionalized structure often resulting in the exclusion of the key 
stakeholders from the proceedings.
220
  
 
The consolidation of these various practical concerns and growing range of normative 
and conceptual critiques into a more coherent restorative justice movement required the 
elaboration of a new theoretical framework. A highly influential contribution was made 
by Nils Christie who, like Auerbach, invoked notions of informal justice. In 1976 Christie 
delivered a public lecture, subsequently published as Conflicts as Property, which is 
today regarded as one of the key restorative justice texts.
221
 In Conflicts as Property 
Christie developed a thorough critique of the conventional criminal justice system 
including the academic discipline of criminology. While he did not use the term 
‗restorative justice‘ he proposed an alternate approach that closely resembles what is 
currently called restorative justice.  
 
Christie starts his lecture by boldly suggesting the dissolution of criminology and the 
existing criminal justice system altogether.
222
 He explains this proposal by arguing that 
crime involves social conflict and that the function of the criminal justice system 
effectively is to take conflicts away from their rightful owners, i.e. those directly 
involved. From the perspective of conflict theory he provocatively claims that ―highly 
industrialised societies do not have too much internal conflict, they have too little‖.223 
This deficiency is the result of theft; Christie‘s central contention is that in so far as crime 
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involves social conflict, criminal justice proceedings serve to take conflicts away from 
their rightful owners.
224
  
 
Christie suggests that conflicts, and crime as a form of social conflict, are the property of 
the victim, offender and to a lesser extent the community. Christie‘s use of the term 
―property‖ is significant and perplexing.  It is certainly not an obvious term in this 
context, yet he clearly makes a particular point of using this term. He could have used 
other variations like ―those involved in‖ or ―affected by‖ a crime, or even the commonly 
used term ―stakeholder‖. Presumably it is not meant to be only rhetorical or metaphorical. 
He does not provide any sort of explanation for this choice of terminology and starts 
using the term in the very first paragraph of his text.  While the use of the term 
―property‖ is not entirely clear, there are some key ideas that do emerge and are relevant 
to this discussion.  
 
For Christie conflicts are not negative only but, if dealt with appropriately, have 
―pedagogical possibilities‖ for the victim, offender and the community.225 Dealing with 
conflict appropriately means that one exercises his/her ownership over their conflict. The 
same logic applies to crime as a form of social conflict. In practical terms Christie 
explains this ownership by way of neighbourhood courts with as few professionals as 
possible and as a ―court of equals representing themselves‖.226 The notion of the state 
acting as the victim‘s representative is for Christie, akin to stealing the victim‘s conflict.  
 
At the outset of the lecture Christie refers to a Tanzanian community court and juxtaposes 
this kind of informal justice model to the prevailing criminal justice model in Norway 
(and elsewhere in the West). The Tanzanian community court is focussed on the ‗owners‘ 
of the conflict with the victim and offender taking centre stage. Others also involved in 
the proceedings are the relatives and friends of the respective parties. Community 
members are also encouraged to participate by asking questions and making relevant 
comments. The most silent parties are the judges. Christie contrasts this account with 
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Scandinavian courts noting that the latter are ―peripheral‖ to the daily life of citizens. 
From the urban location of the courts to the primacy of the judges and lawyers over the 
‗owners of the conflict‘ the criminal justice system ultimately acts as a ―professional 
thief‖ of conflicts. He notes that ―Criminal conflicts have either become other people’s 
property – primarily the property of lawyers – or it has been in other people‘s interests to 
define conflicts away‖.227 Christie concludes his lecture by urging his fellow 
criminologists and criminal justice workers to ―re-establish the credibility of encounters 
between critical human beings‖.228  
 
As already indicated, for Christie the language of ownership and theft are not just 
metaphorical speech but rather involves a re-theorising of the criminal justice system. 
This re-theorising involves different steps. Firstly he rejects the basic assumption of 
"consensus theorists" that social conflict can and should be resolved and that this is part 
of the function of the criminal justice system. But this is itself based on a second basic 
assumption that crime and the criminal justice system should be conceived as a form of 
social conflict regulation and not just in terms of violations of the law or of rights. 
However, the most provocative and controversial move is that of relocating the notion of 
"ownership" and "theft", not in relation to (rights of) property, but in terms of 
"ownership" and "theft" of conflicts. According to Christie ―conflicts represent a 
potential for activity, for participation‖ and it is necessary to reclaim this opportunity for 
participation because ―modern criminal control systems represent one of the many cases 
of lost opportunities for involving citizens in tasks that are of immediate importance to 
them‖.229 
 
Christie‘s re-theorising of the criminal justice model in terms of ownership and theft have 
been welcomed and endorsed by other leading figures in the restorative justice 
movement.   For example, Zehr and Larson Sawin refer to Christie‘s notion of conflict as 
property as providing ―an important theoretical basis for the argument that individuals 
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and communities need to be more fully engaged and empowered in justice‖.230 However, 
their statement is not followed by any further critical engagement with Christie‘s theory; 
it is simply noted and affirmed.    
 
Christie did expand upon his original ideas in some of his subsequent work; however this 
did not really penetrate the mainstream restorative justice literature. A key issue here is 
that Christie‘s account hinges on an analogy between the pre-modern informal justice 
model and the modern criminal justice approach without however indicating how pre-
modern informal justice relates to modern criminal justice. This kind of equation 
disregards the important differences between pre-modern informal justice and modern 
criminal justice.  
 
Following Christie and Auerbach, other writers have developed a so-called historical 
justification for an alternate response to crime. Writers in this school suggest that pre-
modern forms of justice were more community oriented and less punitive than the 
prevailing criminal justice framework:  
―The retributive model of justice is not the only way we have envisioned justice in 
the West. In fact, other models of justice have predominated through most of our 
history. Only within the past several centuries has the retributive paradigm come 
to monopolise our vision‖.231 
 
For our purposes this argument has significant but contradictory implications: On the one 
hand it undercuts any assumptions that the modern criminal justice model is the only or a 
‗natural‘ form of criminal justice as such. On the other hand there is a significant trend in 
the literature that designates restorative justice as a pre-modern form of justice.
232
 On 
both counts this will be relevant when we consider indigenous or customary African 
justice practices in chapter 4.  
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Linked to notions of informal justice is an emphasis on restitution as a more appropriate 
form of sanction for the offender than retributive punishment.
233
 It is important at this 
point to briefly distinguish restitution from some other variants - compensation, 
restitution and reparation. Generally speaking all of these variants will fall under the 
umbrella term ‗rectificatory justice‘ with each carrying different emphasis. Restitution is 
specifically concerned with re-establishing the status quo prior to the violation.
234
 If a 
bicycle was stolen then the appropriate restitution would involve acquiring another 
bicycle for the victim that closely resembles the bicycle previously owned. Compensation 
by comparison entails that ―something [be] given to compensate for loss, suffering or 
injury‖.235 In the dictionary ―reparation‖ is defined in much the same way as 
―compensation‖ - ―the making of amends for a wrong‖.236 For our purposes it might be 
helpful to note that the TRC defined reparation specifically in terms of the stated goal of 
―rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims‖.237 
 
The restitution movement has had a significant effect on the development of restorative 
justice as a field. As already noted, it was on the First International Symposium on 
Restitution in 1975 that the concept of restorative justice began to gain wider currency. 
Today many scholars and lay people alike make the association between restorative 
justice and restitution.
238
 In practice this has meant that the protagonists of restorative 
justice look for appropriate measures of compensation, such as restitution to replace the 
punitive sanctions typical of retributive justice.  
 
The rise of a more pro-victim approach to criminal justice also helped to lay the 
foundations for the elaboration of notions of restorative justice. Victimology, or ―The 
Victim Movement‖, has been identified by many as one of the key contributing pillars in 
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the development of restorative justice as a field.
239
 Morris notes how the perceived failure 
of the conventional criminal justice system to respond to the needs of victims gave rise to 
thinking around restorative justice.
240
  
 
Another background to the development of restorative justice lies in the theological tenets 
of the Mennonite and Quaker traditions.
241
 The first restorative justice process was 
initiated by Dave Worth and Mark Yantzi in 1974; both were members of the Mennonite 
Central Committee. The initiative took the form of a meeting between victims and 
offenders and resembled what is today called ―victim–offender mediation‖ (VOM).242 A 
number of the leading restorative justice theorists are from the Mennonite and Quaker 
traditions. These thinkers include Howard Zehr, Jim Consedine and John Braithwaite. 
This theological influence is manifested in the literature through certain terms key themes 
like forgiveness, redemption and healing. In one article Zehr even invokes the figure of 
Jesus; ―Jesus urges us to love not just our own kind but also our enemies and to practice 
forgiveness‖.243 
 
This brief attempt to sketch the development of the field of restorative justice shows how 
restorative justice has been informed by a range of different concerns across a range of 
disciplines. The key notions and themes derived from different traditions and quarters but 
increasingly converged together into a body of restorative justice literature. To date two 
handbooks on restorative justice have been published.
244
 The emergence of these 
handbooks can be seen as an attempt to consolidate the restorative justice approach both 
on a conceptual and practical level. The handbooks are aimed at a cross-section of 
government, non-government organisations, academics and other practitioners. The 
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presence of these handbooks points to the existence of a growing audience of individuals 
interested in restorative justice. Restorative justice ideas and concepts have been widely 
implemented in different contexts in a range of countries. However, there is still a gap in 
the literature as regards an evaluative assessment of the outcomes of these programmes. 
 
With perhaps the exception of Christie, restorative justice literature does not reflect a 
strong emphasis on theory and has largely been dominated by practitioners. The influence 
of practitioners and the absence of explicit theorisations of restorative justice make it 
difficult to identify the predominant conceptions in this field in definitive terms. 
Nevertheless there are three distinctive conceptions of restorative justice can be identified 
as the following sub-section will discuss.  
 
3.4 Three Conceptions of Restorative Justice 
 
The previous sections have traced the emergence of restorative justice as a distinctive 
sub-field derived from various sources and background traditions. However, though it is  
a distinctive sub-field  and literature has developed in this way it was not the case that 
there was clarity and consensus about the notion of ‗restorative justice‘ itself. Rather, 
though the term ‗restorative justice‘ came to be increasingly and widely used within this 
sub-field, it was also used in varying, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory senses. 
This sub-section will attempt to identify and clarify some of the distinctive conceptions 
of ‗restorative justice‘. These different conceptions should be taken as analytical 
distinctions as they do not necessarily represent different and mutually exclusive 
positions taken by different authors but may occur within the work of the same author or 
be shared between different authors.  
 
These different conceptions can broadly be discussed in terms of three different areas of 
emphasis 1) personal encounter, 2) reparation, and 3) transformation.  The three elements 
of personal encounter, reparation and transformation are singled out in Johnstone and 
Van Ness‘s 2007 Handbook of Restorative Justice as representing three dominant 
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conceptions of restorative justice.
245
 This typology is a departure from other accounts in 
the literature that also identify three dominant approaches or conceptions but classify 
these in terms of 1) process, 2) values and 3) personal encounter.
246
 However, this 
actually perpetuates the ambiguities and lack of clarity in the literature. Separating the 
elements of process, value and encounter does not assist in delineating different 
conceptions of ‗restorative justice‘ since all three elements actually need to be present in 
each conception. Tony Marshall‘s definition of restorative justice is perhaps the most 
widely cited of the ‗process‘ variety of definitions. Marshall conceives of restorative 
justice as ―a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come 
together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its 
implications for the future‖.247  However, such an open-ended account of the collective 
resolution of wrongdoing need not in fact be restorative at all; it could just as well result 
in a resolution to exact vengeance. This and other criticisms led to the emergence of the 
‗values‘ conception intended to ensure that the restorative justice intervention is in fact 
restorative
248
. Almost all advocates of this conception would identify the chief value as 
being that of repair. Restorative justice needs to be focussed on repairing harm. But in 
that case it may be more helpful to discuss reparation as a distinctive conception of 
‗restorative justice‘ next to the personal encounter conception.  
 
This discussion will opt to follow Johnstone and Van Ness‘s typology in that they offer 
an analytically clear synthesis of the underlying conceptions of ‗restorative justice‘ 
informing existing approaches in this field. These different conceptions do not strictly 
correspond to positions taken by specific restorative justice theorists; rather the three 
conceptions should be seen as analytical distinctions shared by a range of scholars. This 
typology is also not exhaustive and can certainly be built upon in various ways.  
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3.4.1 ―Restorative Justice‖ as Personal Encounter  
Broadly speaking the personal encounter conception of ‗restorative justice‘ can be said to 
stem from the kind of concerns raised by Christie.  Namely that those most affected by 
the crime or wrong-doing ought to have a more direct role in deciding how the crime 
ought to be addressed. The victim, offender and family or community members all need 
to be involved and encounter each other in the criminal justice process. The so-called 
professionals or legal experts should play more of a facilitator role with decision-making 
mainly being done by the victim, offender and family/community members. As such the 
personal encounter conception of restorative justice is intended to provide an alternative 
to the marginalised and passive role that victims and offenders ordinarily play in the 
criminal justice process where the key roles tend to be taken by the prosecutor, counsel 
for the defence, judge and jury . Personal encounter within this alternative criminal 
justice process typically takes the form of victim-offender mediation or conferencing. 
The encounter needs to provide a space for those most affected by the crime to discuss 
what happened and agree on what needs to be done to address the harm.  
 
The central feature of this conception is thus that a personal encounter between victim 
and offender is conceived as a condition of restorative justice. There is divergence 
whether the personal encounter is a necessary or a sufficient condition for restoring the 
harm caused by the wrongdoing; similarly it is not always clear whether such personal 
encounters are conceived as constitutive of restorative justice, or as an instrumental 
means towards restorative justice.  According to Johnstone and Van Ness the personal 
encounter conception of restorative justice is typically motivated along consequentialist 
lines with proponents claiming that the victim/offender encounters will have restorative 
consequences such as rehabilitation, deterrence, norm clarification, restitution, reducing 
fear and trauma.
249
 However, conceiving of the personal encounter within a 
consequentialist framework is problematic in that there is no guarantee that the personal 
encounter will in fact have the desired effects.  Johnstone and Van Ness acknowledge this 
and note that some proponents suggest that such personal encounters need to be 
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constrained by certain values such as ―non-domination, empowerment, respectful 
listening and equal concern for all stakeholders‖.250 Declan Roche suggests that in order 
for this personal encounter to be restorative ―victims and offenders must both be given a 
say, and the focus of people‘s deliberations must be on repairing the harm suffered by 
victims and reintegrating offenders into their communities‖.251 
 
It is not clear whether Johnstone and Van Ness are correct that personal encounters are 
typically viewed in consequentialist terms in the literature.  A close reading of Christie, 
for example, suggests that he has a different approach in mind, seeing the personal 
encounter as a sufficient condition for restorative justice and as constitutive in restoring 
the harm caused through the wrong doing. But this controversial position does not appear 
to be clearly articulated elsewhere in the literature.   
 
Aside from these theoretical issues the personal encounter conception of ‗restorative 
justice‘ also raises various practical concerns. Is it a condition of the personal encounter 
that the victim determines the level and nature of the interaction? What if the offender 
refuses to go along with this? At a more basic level the personal encounter seems to 
depend on the assumption that the offender accepts the determination of the offence as 
well as culpability for the crime. The literature does not consider a situation in which an 
offender insists that no crime has been committed and/or does not accept culpability. In 
terms of participation there are those who argue for completely voluntary participation in 
such personal encounters and then those who allow for a measure of coercion.
252
  What if 
the victim‘s demands are inappropriate or even amount to revenge or humiliation? When 
and how is non-imposed mutual agreement to be achieved? Other practical concerns 
relate to how the level of participation in a personal encounter is potentially influenced by 
the extent to which the parties can articulate themselves. From studies that have been 
done on various restorative justice processes, it appears that more articulate professionals 
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tend to dominate the encounter process.
253
 Taken together these conceptual and practical 
problems indicate that the personal encounter conception of ‗restorative justice‘, while 
appealing, has not yet been adequately developed and explicated.  
 
3.4.2 ―Restorative Justice‖ as Reparation 
As already noted the notion of reparation has been closely associated with the 
development of restorative justice. At the First International Symposium on Restitution in 
1975 Albert Eglash advanced a notion of restorative justice that incorporated what he 
called ―creative restitution‖.254 The key components of his proposed notion of creative 
restitution involved the following. Firstly, he emphasised that the focus ought to be on the 
―harmful consequences‖ of the offender‘s actions rather than solely on the action itself. 
Furthermore he argued for more active roles for both victim and offender with the 
specific aim being to ―reverse [the offender‘s] behaviour from one of taking or harming 
to one of giving or helping‖.255 
 
Over the years Eglash‘s ideas have been taken up by others and gained currency as an 
influential conception of restorative justice.
256
 Howard Zehr is the leading proponent of 
this reparative conception of ‗restorative justice‘. In his various writings he explains the 
relational nature of the harm caused by wrongdoing and the necessity of an encounter 
between victim and offender in repairing this harm. According to Zehr, the harm caused 
by a crime relates to the loss of personal autonomy for the victims. It is not entirely clear 
as to why an offender would be harmed through the crime. Zehr explains this harm in two 
ways. Firstly he suggests that offenders often act out of a place of previous harm done to 
them; ―they do harm in part because of harm done to them‖ mostly through childhood 
abuse.
257
 So this existing state of harm is then made worse through the crime in that the 
offender may be alienated from their community as a consequence of the crime. This line 
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of thinking places the harm done to the offender as a result of the way in which the 
criminal justice process deals with the crime. So, a different approach to dealing with the 
crime may avoid this harm. And similarly, an alternative approach may lessen the harm 
(the loss of personal autonomy) experienced by the victim first through the crime and 
then secondly through the criminal justice process that largely exasperates this loss of 
autonomy.   
 
The reparative conception takes as its point of departure the acknowledgement that crime 
results in harm and suffering for both the victim as well as for the offender. Justice thus 
entails the repair of the harm that was caused by the wrongdoing to both victims and 
offenders. Ideally the form of reparation is jointly negotiated by the victim and offender 
and their supporting communities. Strictly speaking reparation does not need to involve a 
participative process.  
 
This conception of restorative justice draws on an approach to reparation that implies the 
kind of participation involved in a personal encounter. It is this process of making 
reparation that is, according to some of the proponents, a sufficient condition of justice.
258
 
No further sanction is required to punish the offender. The kind of reparation sought is 
non-punitive and should seek to repair the harm caused to the victim without inflicting 
further pain on the offender. As already noted above this conception is closely tied to the 
encounter conception.  One would assume that a composite encounter process should 
accompany the reparation.  Johnstone and Van Ness do note this but add that in the event 
that a personal encounter is not possible, a reparative outcome can still be deemed 
restorative if certain restorative principles are met. Whereas the personal encounter 
conception is primarily focussed on the inclusion of all parties to the wrong-doing having 
a say in how the crime is addressed, the reparative conception is primarily focussed on 
ensuring that the outcome of the process repairs the harm caused to the greatest extent 
possible.  It follows that the personal encounter conception of restorative justice is a 
‗process‘ conception, while  restorative justice as reparation is more concerned with 
‗outcomes‘ or ‗product‘.  
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The practical difficulty with both the personal encounter conception and the reparative 
conception of restorative justice is that this kind of encounter is not always possible. In 
the event that a direct encounter cannot take place then repair of the harm caused by the 
crime can take place in other ways. Johnstone and Van Ness suggest the possible option 
of ―a sentence of restitution rather than a fine or imprisonment‖259. This kind of 
flexibility distinguishes the reparative conception from the personal encounter conception 
in that for most proponents of the latter it would be unacceptable to incorporate elements 
of the formal justice system because this would diminish the significance of the 
encounter. For proponents of the reparative conception the extent of the encounter is 
secondary to the chief aim of repairing the harm first for the victim and then for the 
offender. On Johnstone and Van Ness‘s account, it seems that a more general 
understanding of reparation is at play, which they do not fully explain.  
 
3.4.3 ―Restorative Justice‖ as Transformation 
For many theorists and practitioners restorative justice aims to respond to more than 
particular crimes or initiate various specific reforms but is concerned with bringing about 
a transformation of criminal justice generally. John Braithwaite, a leading restorative 
justice scholar articulates this transformative conception as follows: 
―Restorative justice, conceived as an intellectual tradition or as an approach to 
political practice, involves radical transformation. On this radical view restorative 
justice is not simply a way of reforming the criminal justice system; it is a way of 
transforming the entire legal system, our family lives, our conduct in the 
workplace, our practice of politics. Its vision is of an holistic change in the way 
we do justice in the world‖.260  
 
Similarly Zehr and Toews explain the transformative potential of restorative justice in 
terms of;  
―challenge[ing] our understanding of the social world…restorative justice 
processes contribute to the breakdown of othering and social distance. Victims, 
offenders and those involved in facilitating these processes begin to see beyond 
stereotypes and generalisations that they have about the people involved in the 
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crime event. They see the victims as people deeply wounded by an event and hear 
the personal impact of the crime upon their lives. They hear the individually 
unique perspective of offenders and their ideas for justice. Through the dialogue 
they are no longer in categories of ―us‖ and ―them‖ but rather in the category of 
―we‖, shaped by their mutually created meaning of the crime event‖.261 
 
At a general conceptual level the main difference between this transformative conception 
and the other two conceptions – personal encounter and reparative -- is that the latter two 
are individualist while the former implies a more holistic approach. Johnstone and Van 
Ness describe it as an understanding of ―ourselves as inextricably connected to and 
identifiable with other beings in the ‗external‘ world‖.262 While Johnstone and Van Ness 
don‘t make the connection, it seems that this conception of restorative justice stems from 
linkages with the Mennonite and Quaker traditions.
263
 This association may tie in with 
Christie‘s discussion of informal pre-modern responses to wrongdoing. The 
―transformative‖ conception of restorative justice appears to have implicit affinities with 
earlier religious traditions as well as with more radical modern political movements 
without explicitly stating the normative commitments involved.   
 
Of the three dominant conceptions of restorative justice the transformative conception is 
perhaps the most elusive. The writings articulating this conception are characterised by a 
level of vagueness and a general lack of clarity. Very little explanation is offered of the 
nature and objectives of restorative justice as transformation.  
 
3.5 Relevance and Significance of Restorative Justice in the Criminal Justice Context 
 
From the above discussion of the literature in the criminal justice field it is difficult to 
identify a coherent and independent conceptual framework for restorative justice. Rather 
what have emerged are some general points of commonality and difference that overlap 
across all three conceptions.   
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The first point of commonality relates to the definition of crime as ―a violation of people 
and interpersonal relationships‖ as opposed to the legal construction of crime as a 
violation against the state.
264
 It is from this view of crime as a violation of people and of 
relationships that the characteristic concern of restorative justice with the need to restore 
personal and social relations follows. It also follows that the restoration of personal and 
social harm necessarily needs to involve the victim, offender and community. And this in 
turn implies a ‗process‘ view of justice: what matters is not so much a ‗just‘ outcome but 
that all those affected by the crime are involved in the decision regarding the best way to 
repair the harm caused by the violation. ―For restorative justice supporters, the chief way 
of recognising the personal dimension of crime is to involve victims, offenders and their 
respective families and friends in the process of dealing with its aftermath‖.265  
 
This focus on the personal and social dimensions of crime is by far one of the most 
significant aspects of restorative justice. All three of the above conceptions emphasise the 
relational impact of the wrong doing and that it is this harm that needs to be resolved by 
the parties involved. Conceiving of crime as a violation against the state follows from 
basically conceiving it in relation to the law and as a violation of rights. So the alternative 
is that of a sociological conception of crime rather than a legal and formal approach. One 
must then ask how this kind of sociological conception of crime relates to matters of 
justice.  Violations of people and interpersonal relations could also be addressed and 
framed in terms of pathology and therapy for the harm caused or trauma suffered; this 
need not involve justice. 
 
The second point of commonality is the assertion that the state, public institutions and 
professionals cannot have the monopoly over the way that crime is dealt with; victims, 
offenders and communities must play an active role in criminal justice. Of particular 
relevance here is Christie‘s point that if a society is deprived of their property rights to 
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their conflict the society will lose out on opportunities for norm-clarification and 
deliberation over right and wrong.
266
  
 
Despite these two significant areas of commonality there are also significant differences 
cutting across the various conceptions of restorative justice. While some theorists and 
practitioners conceive of restorative justice in more limited ways in relation to specified 
problems and shortcomings which can be addressed while continuing to operate within 
the overall criminal justice model (partial restorative justice), others conceive of it more 
radically as a systemic alternative to the entire criminal justice model (comprehensive 
restorative justice).
267
  The less radical approach that of ―partial restorative justice‖, is 
characteristic of those interested in promoting practical innovations and specific reforms 
of criminal justice institutions and practices. This partial approach makes allowance for 
strict accountability through some form of sanction, although this sanction may not 
always be punitive. Hence this partial restorative justice is compatible with the retention 
of basic aspects of criminal prosecutions while introducing measures for restorative 
justice as supplements. Within this limited perspective partial restorative justice may also 
be compatible with stipulating the sufficient conditions for specified practices of 
restorative justice. Thus in ‗victim-offender mediation‘ there must be a personal 
encounter between offender and survivor.
268
 In this encounter the offender must make 
disclosure regarding the crime. The survivor and others involved ought to explain how 
the crime has affected them. The offender and survivor then negotiate reparation and this 
form of reparation should address the harm caused by the crime and not create more 
harm. Proponents of partial restorative justice acknowledge that these conditions cannot 
always be met. An encounter is not always possible and it cannot be guaranteed that the 
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offender will make full disclosure or even admit to the crime.
269
 It is not clear if there are 
any necessary conditions for restorative justice.  
 
While there are various specific proposals for partial restorative justice the notions of 
comprehensive restorative justice remain much more vague and undeveloped, making the 
―partial‖ version of restorative justice more applicable to contexts of criminal justice.  
This ―partial‖ version seeks to address certain shortcomings in the existing criminal 
justice framework by trying to make the process more accessible and give it a more 
―human face‖. Holistic in the sense that crime is viewed not only as the violation of law 
breaking, but also as a violation in human relations that causes far reaching harm for all 
parties involved. And accessible in terms of making the process more victim friendly and 
less dominated by legal professionals so the process seeks to include the victim, offender 
and their respective communities of support.  So, on this reading the partial version of 
restorative justice does hold significance and relevance for the existing criminal justice 
framework.  
 
3.6. Relevance and Significance of Criminal Justice Conceptions of Restorative Justice 
for Transitional Justice 
 
This chapter has illustrated the relevance of restorative justice as a relevant newcomer to 
the field of criminal justice. What has also been established is that while this may be the 
case, it has not been possible to identify a clear and coherent conceptual framework of 
restorative justice within the criminal justice context. At best we have been able to 
identify certain dominant lines of emphasis. The two paramount lines of emphasis being 
that crime is approached as a violation of people and interpersonal relationships and that 
institutions and professionals cannot have the monopoly over the way in which crime is 
dealt with, rather all stakeholders need to be involved.  
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Both of these points are relevant to the transitional justice framework established in 
Chapter 1. The insistence of restorative justice that all stakeholders be involved in dealing 
with the aftermath of a crime resonates with the framework‘s notion that transitional 
justice be responsive to the needs of different actors (perpetrators, victims, beneficiaries). 
Another point of resonance relates to the manner in which criminal justice conceptions of 
restorative justice appeal to the transitional justice notion of a ―society judging itself‖. 
Moreover, criminal justice conceptions of restorative justice accommodates the 
transitional justice concern for feasibility in the face of limited financial resources.  
 
Where criminal justice conceptions fall short is in terms the transitional justice focus on 
acknowledgement and accountability.  
 
Christie‘s theory of conflicts as property may have special relevance to transitional 
justice to the extent that his theory promotes meaningful participation of those affected 
and involved in a conflict/crime. For Christie the victim, perpetrator and wider 
community all benefit from ―owning‖ their conflict and being actively involved in its 
aftermath. Victims regain a sense of autonomy, perpetrators are given the opportunity to 
redefine their role from taker to giver and perhaps most importantly for Christie the wider 
community is afforded the crucial opportunity for ―norm-clarification‖.270 
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Chapter Four 
Conception(s) of Restorative Justice in African Traditional Justice Practices as 
Mechanisms for Transitional Justice: Gacaca and Mato Oput 
 
Thus far we have surveyed two sources of thinking on and around ‗restorative justice‘; 
first, the religious and theological discourse of reconciliation articulated in the work of 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Ch.2) and next the different notions of ‗restorative justice‘ 
developed within the criminal justice literature (Ch.3). The third and final source under 
review, to be discussed in this chapter, is that of the conceptions of ‗restorative justice‘ 
associated with the adaptation of African traditional justice practices as mechanisms of 
transitional justice, with particular reference to the use of Gacaca in post-genocide 
Rwanda and Mato Oput in Northern Uganda.
271
 Our interest in these two African 
traditional justice practices relates to their recent adaptation as mechanisms for 
transitional justice, and more specifically to the sense in which they have been deemed to 
be forms of ‗restorative justice‘ by various scholars in the transitional justice literature. It 
must be stressed that we will not be concerned with these African traditional justice 
practices in their own right. Rather this chapter will survey the literature surrounding the 
adoption of these customary practices as contemporary mechanisms of transitional 
justice, and will focus specifically on the senses in which the literature describes these 
mechanisms as forms of ‗restorative justice‘.  
 
The chapter will commence with a brief discussion of African traditional justice practices 
as an instance of the general phenomenon of ―invented traditions‖, and of the dilemmas 
involved in that. We then turn to a substantive account of Gacaca and Mato Oput as 
mechanisms for transitional justice with a view to the conceptions of ‗restorative justice‘ 
associated with them in the literature. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
significance and relevance of these conceptions of restorative justice within a transitional 
justice framework.  
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4.1. African Traditional Justice Practices as Invented Traditions 
 
In recent years some bold claims have been made literature regarding the nature and 
function of these African traditional justice practices and their relevance in contemporary 
transitional justice contexts. Over and above the claims made by some criminal justice 
theorists on the inherently restorative nature of ―indigenous‖ justice mechanisms, 
transitional justice scholars have made equally bold claims about the restorative character 
of Gacaca and Mato Oput.
272
  
  
In stark contrast to these bold claims are other equally bold claims that suggest that the 
restorative character of these mechanisms has been grossly overstated largely by 
international donors.
273
 An accessible account of this proposition is found in Tim Allen‘s 
Trial Justice. Allen offers a critical perspective on the use of Mato Oput suggesting that 
the ceremony‘s popularity has been exaggerated by traditional and religious leaders as a 
smoke screen for their opposition to the intervention of the ICC.
274
 He uses extracts from 
interviews and illustrates that the matter is not as clear cut as some accounts depict.
275
 He 
posits that extreme religious conservatism coupled with opportunism on the part of some 
religious leaders lies behind calls for forgiveness and repentance.
276
 While it is beyond 
the scope of this discussion to explore Allen‘s hypothesis, the current discussion does not 
presume to align with any one approach. The chief concern of this discussion is on what 
grounds the available literature describes Mato Oput as restorative.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the different conceptions of restorative justice attributed to 
Gacaca and Mato Oput in recent transitional justice literature on Rwanda and Uganda. It 
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sets out to explore what this literature has claimed about Gacaca and Mato Oput as 
traditional justice practices and in what ways it has conceived their adaptations in 
contemporary contexts as examples of restorative justice.  
 
Discussion around African traditional justice practices and customary law runs the risk of 
consolidating an array of diverse and changing cultural practices into an essentialised and 
ahistoric unit in order to make claims about one or other ‗tradition‘ or ‗custom‘. A helpful 
corrective to this tendency is found in Hobsbawm and Ranger‘s notion of ‗invented 
traditions‘ in their seminal work The Invention of Tradition.  
 
Hobsbawm and Ranger define tradition as a set of practices of a ritual or symbolic nature 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules implying continuity with the past and 
customs as the loosely defined and flexible locally based, varied, relatively unconscious 
development of historical patterns of conduct and thought. As distinct from both tradition 
and custom in these senses, ―invented traditions‖ are responses to novel situations which 
take the form of reference to old situations; they are relatively self-conscious and marked 
by rigidity and invariance
277
. Of particular relevance is Ranger‘s chapter on ―The 
Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa‖. Ranger does not deny the reality and 
significance of a diverse array of customary practices for African societies but argues that 
in important respects the institutionalisation of ‗customary law‘ was a colonial 
construction and an invented tradition. Ranger‘s main point is that the invention (and 
codification) of African traditions by the European colonisers eventually led to the 
previously flexible and dynamic customs actually being ‗frozen‘; ―once the ‗traditions‘ 
relating to community identity and land right were written down in court records and 
exposed to the criteria of the invented customary model, a new and unchanging body of 
tradition had been created‖.278 He offers a convincing account of how ―what were called 
customary law, customary land-rights, customary political structure and so on, were in 
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fact all invented by colonial codification‖.279 Ranger argues that the European colonisers 
misunderstood the nature of African customary laws and traditions when they construed 
these as characterised by strict rules and procedures. Rather, ―these societies had certainly 
valued custom and continuity but custom was loosely defined and infinitely flexible. 
Custom helped to maintain a sense of identity but it also allowed for an adaptation so 
spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived‖.280 However, codified as 
‗customary law‘ this ‗invented tradition‘ was then manipulated by elders against youth, 
men against women and subjects against immigrants. The implications are that 
supposedly customary practices like Gacaca and Mato Oput might actually rather be 
invented traditions and part and parcel of a neo-colonial heritage.   
 
Ranger‘s points may certainly need to be clarified on many levels, but his caution is a 
salutary reminder as we explore the possible significance and contribution of African 
Traditional Justice mechanisms like Gacaca and Mato Oput. Some commentators do 
acknowledge the phenomenon of ―invented tradition‖ in this connection. Thus Luc 
Huyse, writing in the Introduction to an IDEA publication on traditional justice 
mechanisms, notes this as an ―important shift in perception and evaluation…that 
traditional techniques, in Rwanda and in other African post-conflict countries, have been 
greatly altered in form and substance by the impact of colonisation, modernisation and 
civil war‖.281  
 
It may also be noted that, apart from the African context, the association of traditional 
justice mechanisms with restorative justice has been contested and debated within the 
field of criminal justice. While some authors, like Howard Zehr, maintain this 
association, others remain more cautious. For instance, Kathleen Daly expresses concern 
over the tendency of some scholars to class all forms of pre-modern justice practices as 
‗restorative‘. 282 She questions the result of this homogenising approach arguing that; 
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―Efforts to write histories of restorative justice, where a pre-modern past is 
romantically (and selectively) invoked to justify a current justice practice, are not 
only in error, but also unwittingly reinscribe an ethnocentrism these authors wish 
to avoid‖.283 
 
Also writing from the perspective of criminal justice, Declan Roche notes that there is no 
guarantee that traditional justice will be restorative; instead vigilantism or mob 
vengeance could ensue.
284
 Similarly, both Harry Blagg and Chris Cunneen problematise 
the relationship between restorative justice and indigenous justice mechanisms.
285
 And 
significantly John Braithwaite, the leading scholar on reintegrative shaming, notes that 
restorative justice practices don‘t necessarily replicate indigenous practices.286   
 
With these caveats in mind we now attempt to explore how the mechanisms of Gacaca 
and Mato Oput have been described as examples of restorative justice. The relevance and 
implications of these critical points will be discussed further in the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
   
 
4.2 The Gacaca Courts of Rwanda 
 
Background 
The customary practice of Gacaca had been largely an ad hoc ―local dispute resolution 
mechanism‖ where minor disputes would be adjudicated by male community elders 
(inyangamugayo).
287
 Local Gacaca hearings were the first level of dispute resolution 
before taking the matter to the king (mwami). The Gacaca of old was primarily aimed at 
―the restoration of social harmony, and to a lesser extent the establishment of the truth 
about what happened, the punishment of the perpetrator, or even compensation through a 
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284
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gift‖.288 Ingelare notes that colonial rule saw Gacaca lose legitimacy in the face of 
Western written law. Following independence however, Gacaca ―evolved towards a 
semi-traditional or semi-administrative body‖ with local authorities being closely linked 
with Gacaca and using the mechanism as an initial port of call before taking matters to 
the formal court system.
289
  
 
The mechanism of Gacaca
290
 Courts was introduced by the Rwandan government as a 
vehicle for dealing with the massive numbers of genocide crimes perpetrated between 1 
October 1990 and 31 December 1994. (A full account of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, its 
root causes, ramifications and consequences, cannot be attempted in this discussion
291
 ). 
As such the Gacaca process was an enforced response to a critical need for an 
extraordinary justice process in the aftermath of a mass atrocity, a need which the regular 
criminal justice system was quite incapable of dealing with.  
 
The genocide saw large numbers of the Hutu population engaged in mass killings of the 
Tutsi minority, killing close to one million people and displacing over a million more.
292
 
The genocide also resulted in thousands of Hutu deaths.
293
 The exile-based and 
predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of the state on 4 July 1994 and 
gradually ended the genocide. Within months the Rwandan government requested the UN 
Security Council to establish a tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of the genocide thereby 
initiating the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
294
 The ICTR was designed to 
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deal only with those most responsible for planning the genocide. The so-called foot 
soldiers or genocidaires would have to be dealt with by domestic courts. This left the 
largely non-existent Rwandan criminal justice system facing a case load in excess of 100 
000 accused persons.
295
 Although significant international aid was channelled into 
rebuilding the justice system, at best 1500-2000 cases could be processed per year, 
meaning that a best case scenario would require up to 50 years to try all the detainees.
296
 
 
These factors led to a search for alternatives to criminal prosecutions. By 1999 the 
Rwandan government had commenced extensive discussions and consultations in order 
to explore the possibility of using an adaptation of the customary informal justice practice 
of Gacaca at the level of local communities as a possible alternative or complement to the 
existing criminal trials.
297
   
These discussions explained Gacaca in terms of ―participatory justice‖ whereby: 
 
―That former Gacaca was a court with honest men, which settled disputes arising 
from the family or between neighbouring families; on ordinary matters in the 
peoples living conditions such as temporary separation between a man and his 
wife, the cattle causing damages to somebody's crops, etc. Severe offences were 
tried before the Chief of the village, and more severe ones before the King‖. 298 
 
 
Scant detail is provided in these texts regarding the nature of the ―old Gacaca‖.  It is 
invoked as a practical measure to alleviate the burden on the criminal justice system and 
more significantly as a means of ―rebuilding Rwanda‖. The report from the Presidency‘s 
year long ―Reflection Meetings‖ with analysts and policy makers singles out Gacaca as a 
way of eradicating the ―genocide ideology‖. The report notes that some had concern 
about using Gacaca for such serious crimes. This concern is dealt with by noting that 
using Gacaca 
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―is not minimizing them and making them a simple offence. It is rather putting 
the crime of genocide and massacres at the level in which it was committed. The 
crime of genocide and massacres and other crimes against humanity were 
committed in public; and-too many people actively participated in them‖.299 
  
The Report recommends the new and improvised version of Gacaca as a way of engaging 
the Rwandan public, ―It is people who are to make it up with themselves‖.300  
 
The Rwandan government enacted the Gacaca Law (Organic Law No 40/2000 of 
26/01/2001) to establish the Gacaca Courts. This law drew on the earlier Genocide Law 
(Organic Law No 08/1996) which outlined the confession and guilt plea procedure for 
genocide suspects as well as established four categories of genocide crimes. Initially the 
Genocide Law identified four categories of crimes: category 1 concerns the planners of 
the genocide and those guilty of sexual offences; category 2 concerns those who 
committed one or more killings; category 3 concerns those who committed assault 
without the intention to kill and category 4 concerns those guilty of looting and 
destruction. The 2001 Gacaca Law designates categories 2-4 under the jurisdiction of the 
Gacaca Courts with category 1 falling under domestic criminal courts. The Gacaca 
legislation frames the Gacaca Courts in terms of attaining five goals.
301
 1) Establish the 
truth about what happened, 2) Expedite the legal proceedings of all the accused, 3) 
Eradicate the culture of impunity, 4) Reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity, and 
5) Using the capacities of Rwandan society to deal with its problems through a justice 
based on Rwandan custom. 
 
The Gacaca process was piloted for an eighteen month period from June 2002 in a series 
of trials and assessment mechanisms. The findings from the pilot phase led to a revision 
of the Gacaca Law in 2004.
302
 The revisions were mostly aimed at speeding up the 
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process so the size of the bench was reduced, as was the quorum. In addition, the 
categories were amended with the former categories 2 and 3 being combined into 
category 2 making the previous fourth category now the third. Another important 
addition to the law was an alternative penalty of community service (TIG) if the 
stipulated confession procedure was followed. National rollout began in July 2006 with 
the more than 12 000 Gacaca Courts.
303
 From 2007 the pace of the trials increased due to 
the set deadline of end December 2008. In January 2008 the Rwandan cabinet approved 
the extension of the jurisdiction of the Gacaca courts to include all genocide crimes, 
including category 1.
304
  
 
The Gacaca Law also established that the different categories of crimes would be heard at 
four different administrative levels – cell, sector, district and province. The cell level will 
deal with category 4, the sector with category 3 and district level with category 2 with the 
province level available to hear appeals.
305
   
 
These amendments and adaptations as well as the dominant role of the state meant that 
the Gacaca Courts are a distinctly different form of communal justice compared to earlier 
customary practices of Gacaca.
306
 Ingelaere argues that the Gacaca Courts are a clear 
example of Ranger‘s invented traditions.307 This is acknowledged by Rwandan 
Ambassador Sezibera in an interview with Helena Cobban.
308
 Indeed, the new ‗invented‘ 
Gacaca Courts are a radical departure from the former customary practice. This has 
important implications for the claims made about the links between traditional justice 
mechanisms and restorative justice. Decisions to adapt and amend the Gacaca mechanism 
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were motivated by pragmatic concerns, namely that the government wanted to ensure that 
survivors would see justice in their lifetime and that suspects would enjoy some form of 
due process.
309
  
 
 
Description of the process 
The available accounts of the Gacaca Courts sketch a picture that is far from uniform. 
Some accounts seem to essentialise Gacaca and do not pay significant attention to how 
the mechanism has been altered.
310
 Other commentators stress these differences and even 
suggest that a Gacaca Court hearing in one district will be very different in terms of 
process and substance to a hearing in another district.
311
 As has been noted, Gacaca 
Courts are guided by legislation that does bring some uniformity, but it would be 
misguided to assume that all Gacaca Courts are identical. This discussion will be limited 
in that it draws on accounts from observers and officials and not from direct 
participants.
312
 The purpose is simply to give a general idea of how the Gacaca process 
unfolds so that any restorative features can be discussed in the following section.  
 
A key feature of the Gacaca Courts is the decentralised nature of the courts with a few 
courts in each local community and lay people from that community presiding over the 
hearings. During 4-7 October 2001 254 427 judges (inyangamugayo) were elected 
through a national election process. These 254 427 judges were spread over 12 000 
courts. Penal Reform International (PRI) observed the election process and described it as 
taking place in a ―disciplined and fair manner‖.313 According to PRI 87% of Rwandans 
participated in the elections. The main criteria for the election of judges appear to be 
education and gender with very few female judges. The same report also finds that the 
training of the judges was done from a legal perspective only with Attorneys without 
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Borders (ASF) drawing up the training manuals and providing little or no input on non-
legal aspects of the training or any insight into restorative justice.
314
 A 2005-2007 opinion 
survey found that while 92% of the general population agrees that the judges are honest 
and respect the truth, only 69% of survivors and 32% of prisoners agree.
315
  
 
Once the judges were elected the first pilot phase of Gacaca took place from June 2002 to 
November 2002.  This phase focussed on collecting information from confessions and 
accusations at the cell level (similar in size to urban neighbourhoods). The procedure for 
obtaining confessions was set out in the Gacaca Law.
316
  The law provides for a suspect 
to confess, give full disclosure of the crimes, make a public apology and request a 
reduced sentence or conversion of jail time to community service. The manner in which 
these confessions are handled are dealt with in a 2003 Penal Reform International report. 
The report suggests that the pressure to confess may result in a presumption of guilt 
rather than a presumption of innocence.
317
 Ingelaere detects an important shift from plea-
bargain style confessions intended to promote truth telling to accusations prone to 
manipulation for settling scores.
318
 These accusations were difficult to verify and 
increased the number of suspects from the initial 130 000 accused and imprisoned to well 
over 700 000.
319
 The information gathered through confessions and accusations was then 
used to categorise suspects according to the categories of crimes outlined in the Gacaca 
Law. Initially categories 2-4 would be tried through the Gacaca Courts, but as of 2008 the 
Gacaca Courts now also have jurisdiction over category 1 (sexual crimes).    
 
In a slightly different vein, the PRI report also noted certain cultural norms that view 
confession in front of the victim and their families as an insult from the perpetrator.
320
 
This would seem to suggest that in the light of such cultural norms obtaining confessions 
would preclude the possibility of reconciliation and restorative justice.  
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After this information gathering during the pilot phase the Gacaca courts commenced in 
July 2006. The information previously gathered could now be used in the hearings in 
which the accused or confessor, victim or accuser appeared. The Court gathers in a local 
meeting place and the judge reads aloud the information and testimonies that have been 
collected for the case. Witnesses and other parties are permitted to speak and raise any 
issues they deem relevant. Once all parties have had their say the judges discuss the case 
amongst themselves and then deliver the verdict to the Court.
321
 If the accused is not 
happy with the verdict there is the option of appeal to the sectoral Gacaca appeal court.  
 
Restorative Elements of Gacaca 
The literature on the Gacaca hearings does not agree on the extent to which they involve 
elements of ‗restorative justice‘. It is not even clear whether ‗restorative justice‘ can be 
said to be a main objective of the Gacaca process. Ingelaere makes the important 
observation that the initial founding discussions did not view the Gacaca Courts as a 
mechanism of restorative justice but rather as one of accountability.
322
 It is not clear 
when or how the association of the new Gacaca Courts with restorative justice emerged. 
The Gacaca Law that established the courts does list reconciliation as a goal but we 
cannot assume a linkage between reconciliation and restorative justice. Still, even if the 
initial purpose of Gacaca may not have been expressed in terms of restorative justice, 
others writing on the Courts have made the connection in various ways.  
 
Helena Cobban describes Gacaca as an example of restorative justice that aims at 
repairing relationships rather than at punishment. Cobban does not take the retributive 
functions of the Gacaca courts into account and simply ignores these features of the 
Courts. Cobban distinguishes between a ―Western, prosecutorial system‖ that is punitive 
and restorative justice that employs an ―essentially communitarian view of the 
relationship between the individual and society‖.323 Cobban draws on the exchanges 
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between Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt following the Nuremberg Trials. She concurs 
with Arendt‘s assessment that criminal trials illustrate ―the inadequacy of the prevailing 
legal system and of current juridical concepts to deal with the facts of administrative 
massacres organised by the state apparatus‖.324 Cobban transfers this acknowledgement 
of the limits of the law to the Rwandan case and notes that ―the mass-participatory nature 
of the killing makes individual accountability even harder to disentangle [and], the 
prosecutorial method may need even more help from other disciplines and traditions‖.325 
She concludes by noting the need for ―a distinction between policy response to events in 
more settled times and those adopted after times of atrocity‖.326  
 
Also writing prior to the commencement of the Gacaca Courts, Mark Drumbl noted that 
it would be highly problematic if the Rwandan government were to succumb to 
international human rights groups and make the Gacaca hearings more like a criminal 
trial. He contends that to the extent to which Gacaca is framed as a criminal trial it will 
fail to promote reconciliation and peace.
327
 However, others have noted that the potential 
success of Gacaca Courts is precisely its ―innovative character‖ which is a ―mixture of 
judicial systems and of retributive and restorative justice‖.328 Graybill and Lanegran 
suggest that Gacaca has ―relevance to broader experiments of reconciliatory justice‖ for 
at least three reasons. They suggest that the Gacaca courts would promote confession, 
apology and reparation.
329
  They do not offer any explanation and simply assume that this 
―reconciliatory justice‖ can be thought of as an example of restorative justice.   
 
Writing subsequent to the launch of the Gacaca hearings, Lars Waldorf traces the 
development of the Gacaca Courts from the first pilot phase in 2002 to 2006 and notes 
that there has throughout been a tension between the retributive and restorative elements, 
between ―confessions and accusations, plea-bargains and trials, forgiveness and 
punishment, community service and incarceration‖. For Waldorf he considers 
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confessions, plea-bargains, forgiveness and community service to be elements of 
restorative justice as against accusations, trials, punishment and incarceration as elements 
of retributive justice.   
 
Waldorf notes that the changes in legislation are such that ―Gacaca has become 
increasingly retributive both in design and practice‖.330 He takes a highly critical stance 
and challenges the common assumptions about Gacaca. He contends that the Gacaca 
Courts are not ‗customary‘ or ‗traditional‘, nor are they participative and ultimately the 
Courts are not restorative. Waldorf argues that the Gacaca Courts cannot be classified as 
―traditional‖, ―customary‖ or ―indigenous‖ for the following reasons. The Courts 
represent an official state institution ―linked to the state apparatus of prosecutions and 
incarceration, and applying codified, rather than ‗customary‘ law‖.331 In contrast to the 
previous forms of Gacaca that dealt with civil matters, the Gacaca Courts try serious 
crimes.   Another departure from the previous Gacaca system is the fact that in the new 
Gacaca the judges are not the community elders, but are elected and are mostly young.
332
  
 
In addition to the Courts no longer being ‗traditional‘ Waldorf identifies other problems 
with the Gacaca Courts suggesting that they are biased in focus (no attention to RPF 
violence), do not assist with the promised reparations to survivors and that the Courts are 
not conducive for testimony from victims of sexual violence. He also cites the lack of 
participation from the population (members of local communities either did not attend the 
Gacaca trials, or if they attended they did not take an active part in the proceedings), the 
unreliability of the information that is provided and the fact that because Gacaca has 
become so politicised it in fact promotes collective guilt, which in turn hinders 
reconciliation and ultimately contributes to a worsening of inter-ethnic relations.
333
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Luc Huyse also finds that although reconciliation is one of the stated goals of the Gacaca 
Courts, ―the actual Gacaca is strongly oriented towards retribution‖.334 Another instance 
of this same approach is to be found in the series of research reports published by Penal 
Reform International. These reports are authored by researchers who attended Gacaca 
hearings and undertook extensive fieldwork.
335
 The Penal Reform reports emphasise that 
the Gacaca Courts in their revised format are more concerned with legalistic retribution 
than reconciliation.
336
  
 
The Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) commissioned an 
opinion survey to measure the response to and successes of Gacaca spanning 2005-2007. 
The findings from this survey offer helpful insight into how Rwandans gauge the process. 
Full details regarding the methodology and design of the survey can be accessed from the 
NURC website.
337
 The survey works with three groups of respondents – survivors, 
prisoners, and members of the general public. The ‗survivors‘ and ‗prisoners‘ are those 
involved in the Gacaca hearings as victims and accused while the ‗general public‘ are the 
members of local communities who may or may not have attended a hearing.  
 
The findings from the survey illustrate the exceedingly high expectations that all three 
groups have of the Gacaca Courts with 99% of the general public, 92% of the survivors 
and 79% of the prisoners population agreeing that  the Gacaca Courts are an essential 
step toward peace and reconciliation in Rwanda.
338
 It is perhaps not surprising then that 
with such high expectations the actual implementation of the Courts has been 
disappointing for some. A majority of genocide survivors (76%) feels that public 
testimony during the Gacaca hearings worsens tensions between families and that the 
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families of those found guilty of crimes of genocide will always feel resentful (66%).
339
 
Prisoners (71%) agree that testimony during the Gacaca Courts aggravates tensions. In 
terms of security the report also finds that significant majorities of genocide survivors 
(82%) and prisoners (54%) say they feel threatened during the Gacaca hearings. 
 
Ultimately the report finds that public opinion on the Gacaca Courts is mixed with high 
expectations for closure for survivors but at the same time equally high levels of 
suspicion about the integrity of the process from all three groups interviewed. 
Importantly, the report found that there is a growing gulf between the survivor and prison 
populations. Respondents had high expectations of the Gacaca Courts assuming the 
integrity of the process. But they have serious doubts about the integrity of the actual 
process, and hence are also disappointed by the outcomes. Some of the specific issues at 
stake regarding the integrity of the process, such as the trustworthiness of the judges as 
well as the validity of testimony pose serious challenges to any prospect of the Gacaca 
Courts being examples of restorative justice.  
 
Taking into account both the comments from researchers, observers and Rwandan 
citizens we are left with a mixed assessment of Gacaca‘s contribution to ‗restorative 
justice‘. There are elements of the process that can be called restorative but there are also 
mitigating factors that compromise the restorative value of these elements. The 
potentially restorative elements include the localised settings of the Courts, the fact that 
the judges are mostly from the community where the conflict occurred, all stakeholders 
are given an opportunity to speak and the alternative penalty of Community Service as 
oppose to punishment in prison.  
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4.3 Mato Oput Rituals in Northern Uganda 
 
Background 
The conflict in northern Uganda is entrenched and complex – spanning at least 20 years. 
The conflict has its roots in a popular rebellion against President Yoweri Museveni‘s 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) government but has over the years been eclipsed 
by Joseph Kony‘s Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) into a brutal war primarily involving 
civilians. It has been estimated that in excess of 1.4 million people have been displaced 
and tens of thousands killed, raped or abducted.
340
 One of the LRA‘s strategies is to 
abduct and then force the abductees to ―kill, trample, beat, mutilate, or abduct friends, 
relatives‖.341  
Following the Amnesty Act of 2000 there have been significant numbers of returning 
soldiers.
342
 These ―soldiers‖ are in many ways also ―victims‖ because they were abducted 
and coerced into all manner of violent behaviour. Since 2000 a range of traditional 
healing rituals have been used to help reintegrate returning soldiers back into their 
communities.
343
 More recently these traditional mechanisms have gained significant 
attention as possible transitional justice options.  
Following a 2003 referral to the ICC by President Museveni, the ICC conducted 
investigations and in 2005 issued arrest warrants for five of the LRA‘s top guard. The 
ICC‘s intervention has been met with mixed reactions. Concerns have been raised that the 
ICC intervention will be manipulated by the Museveni government as a way of rubber 
stamping their military efforts in the north.
344
 Similarly, others have noted that given that 
the ICC is unlikely to investigate violations committed by government forces, the ICC 
involvement will only worsen the already volatile north-south divide. Others have 
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expressed concern that the warrants will serve to complicate and prolong negotiation 
efforts with the LRA.  
These and other concerns have featured in the Juba Peace Talks which commenced 
shortly after the issuing of the arrest warrants.  The talks which have been running since 
July 2006 have seen the LRA and the government attempt to find domestic solutions to 
the conflict. This ties in to the ICC‘s principle of complementarity whereby the Court‘s 
intervention is legitimate only in cases in which the state party is either unwilling or 
unable to settle the matter domestically.
345
 To date three of the five points of the peace 
agreement have been signed - Cessation of Hostilities, Comprehensive Solutions to the 
Conflict and Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation.
346
 Of particular relevance 
for our current purposes is the content of Agenda Item No. 3 on Accountability and 
Reconciliation. This item makes specific provision for traditional justice mechanisms 
such as Mato Oput to be ―promoted, with necessary modifications, as a central part of the 
framework for accountability and reconciliation‖.347 
After Agenda Item 3 was signed widespread consultations have been carried out across 
the country with a range of stakeholders to explore different ways of implementing the 
Agreement so as to ensure accountability and reconciliation.
348
  These consultations have 
led to extensive debate not only within Uganda but also amongst transitional justice 
scholars more broadly. Key issues under discussion are the effectiveness of local and 
international justice mechanisms in addressing gross human rights violations and the 
extent to which these mechanisms contribute to peace and justice respectively. This 
distinction has been explained by some in terms of a retributive/restorative dichotomy.
349
 
Other issues concern the shape and extent of the ―modifications‖ of the traditional justice 
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 Article 17, Rome Statute.  
346
 Information from the Beyond Juba website - http://www.beyondjuba.org/transitional_justice.php  
347
 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
and the Lord‘s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, 29 June 2007. 
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Justice and Reintegration. September 2005.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
113 
 
mechanisms so as to meet the requirements of accountability and reconciliation as per the 
Juba Agreement.
350
  
 
It is in this context that claims have been made by traditional and religious leaders as well 
as civil society members regarding the restorative character of traditional justice 
mechanisms. While there are a range of mechanisms that fall under the banner of 
‗traditional justice‘ our particular focus is on claims concerning the Mato Oput ritual.  
 
As a customary practice of the Acholi people the Mato Oput ritual is applied in cases of 
accidental or purposeful killings.
351
 Literally Mato Oput means drinking the bitter root, 
and refers to a communal ritual in which both victims and offenders drink this bitter 
mixture as a symbolic gesture of their willingness to ―swallow and wash away all the 
bitterness that once existed between them‖ .352 As was the case in the previous discussion 
of the Gacaca Courts, there are different interpretations of Mato Oput. We do not 
presume to uncover an official or authoritative account of Mato Oput, but rather to draw 
on accounts in the literature and in so doing distil what Mato Oput entails, and how the 
mechanism is described as being restorative.  
 
Description of the process 
It must be noted that the bulk of the literature on Mato Oput has emerged in response to 
the Juba Talks and to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. This has 
meant that the literature is written with a specific purpose in mind, and hence may well 
fall into the category of Hobsbawm and Ranger‘s invented traditions. One such piece of 
literature, although written prior to the Juba Talks is the 1997 report by Dennis Pain, The 
Bending of Spears.
353
 Pain‘s report popularised Mato Oput as a central requirement for 
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bringing justice and peace to the north and infused Mato Oput with Christian overtones. 
Pain‘s report has been characterised as pursuing a particular agenda and has met with 
criticism and has led some to question the existence and relevance of Mato Oput 
altogether.
354
 As noted at the outset of this chapter, the very notion of ―tradition‖ is 
fraught, and particularly so in contexts in which there are competing political agendas. 
The following account of Mato Oput has endeavoured to remain focussed on the question 
of restorative justice.  
 
In 2005 the Liu Institute for Global Issues published a lengthy study on Mato Oput.
355
 
The study explores what the rituals entail, how they are carried out and the value of the 
rituals for bringing peace to the Acholi people.
356
  The study draws on secondary 
accounts of over 50 ceremonies that took place between 2000-2005, with researchers 
attending one Mato Oput ceremony held at Pajule Camp on April 4 2005. According to 
the Liu Report the process of Mato Oput is voluntary and involves the ―mediation of 
truth; acknowledgment of wrong doing; and reconciliation through symbolic acts and 
spiritual appeasement‖.357 There are nuanced differences of practices across Acholi clans 
but the general principles and beliefs are shared. 
 
Mato Oput is a long and complex process. The Liu Report for instance studies a 
ceremony that takes place in 2005 to deal with a murder which occurred in 1977.
358
  The 
long delay is accounted for as a ‗cooling off‘ period so as to allow anger to subside. The 
length of the period is determined by the parties and is often prolonged due to the 
offender clan not having sufficient resources to pay for the ceremony. Immediately 
following the murder the elders separate the clans involved so as to prevent counter 
attacks.  
                                                 
354
 Chris Dolan, ―Inventing Traditional Leadership? A Critical Assessment of Dennis Pain‘s ‗Bending of 
Spears‘,‖ a COPE Working Paper, April 2000.  
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It is expected that the offender will voluntarily come forward and confess his
359
 guilt. The 
voluntary nature of the confession is described as a central element of Mato Oput. The 
process can only continue once guilt is admitted.  
 
Elders play a vital role as mediators throughout the process. Once guilt is established the 
elders engage with both sides of the conflict in order to ascertain the relevant facts of the 
crime. When the elders deem the ‗cooling off‘ period to have lapsed the two clans are 
brought together in order to reach consensus on the nature of the crime and then to 
negotiate adequate compensation to be paid by the perpetrator clan to the victim clan. 
This process can take any length of time, according to the Elders interviewed in the 2005 
Liu study,  
―Once the process has begun, it can only be ended when all parties are satisfied 
with the account of what has happened, including reflection of the perpetrator on 
the motives for his or her crimes, the circumstances in which it was committed, 
expression of remorse, and the payment of compensation‖.360 
 
It is important that all parties affected by the murder remain involved throughout the 
process.  
 
There is no strict formula for deciding on compensation although it is reported that the 
idea behind compensation is linked to progeny so the compensation is thought of in terms 
of a bride price.  After compensation is paid, the ceremony of ‗drinking the bitter root‘ is 
enacted between the clans; the ceremony is aimed at reconciling the two clans and 
facilitating the reintegration of the offender back into the community. The actual 
ceremony is the final part of the long process.  
 
There are various elements to the ceremony and may vary slightly in different contexts 
but the key elements comprise the following:
361
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The Beating of the Stick -    The ceremony begins with the ‗Beating of the Stick‘. The 
symbolism attached to this ritual seems to revolve around what would happen if the anger 
experienced by the wronged party is not mediated and resolved. The mediator stands 
between representatives from either party and instructs them to ―hold up long thin sticks 
and approach the centre as if they were to attack one another. The men were told to yell 
insults at each other and the women to wail in mourning‖.362 The guilty party is then 
instructed to run away as an act of admission of guilt.  
Slaughter of the Sheep and Goat – The offending clan slaughter a sheep, which represents 
guilt and the victim clan slaughter a goat, which represents unity. The slaughtered 
animals are cut in half and the opposite sides are exchanged between the clans 
representing the admission of guilt and the unity which is now possible again.  
Eating Spoiled Boo (‗Boo Mukwok‘ – spoiled greens) – The significance of this spoiled 
food illustrates that tension has existed long enough for food to spoil. The act of eating 
this spoiled food shows that the clans are now ready to reconcile.  
Drinking of Bitter Root – This symbolizes the bitterness that existed between the parties. 
The drinking takes place while parties kneel with hands behind their backs to show 
reverence for the deceased. Before drinking the parties ―knock heads‖ to show that they 
where once separated but are now united.  
Eating of the Liver – The liver of the cooked goat and sheep is eaten by both parties. The 
liver is thought to be the place where bitterness is stored so eating it together illustrates 
that the clans are united.  
Following this the rest of the food that was prepared is eaten by all present. All the 
remaining food must be eaten to symbolise that no further tension remains.  
 
The elders interviewed agreed that the ―principles, values and symbolic meaning of Mato 
Oput...are essential to rebuilding a devastated Acholi-land‖.363 However, the same elders 
also expressed serious doubts as to the successful modification and adaptation of Mato 
Oput for dealing with matters related to the conflict. As indicated, Mato Oput assumes a 
fairly close community in which the elders know the clan of the victim and the clan of the 
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perpetrator. How would Mato Oput be possible if these details are unknown, who would 
decide on the compensation? And, even if compensation is decided, how would the 
offender be able to afford this given the extremely high levels of poverty, particularly 
among returnees.
364
 Another concern has been raised regarding the scope of crimes 
committed during the conflict; a high degree of sexual violence has taken place involving 
men and women. Would Mato Oput be able to accommodate such crimes?
365
 Similarly, 
concern has been raised regarding the extent to which the conflict has compromised and 
weakened the social fabric, particularly the role of the Elders to such an extent that these 
traditional mechanisms are not feasible.
366
  
 
Restorative Elements 
Mato Oput forms one aspect of a bouquet of traditional justice mechanisms practised by 
the Acholi people of Northern Uganda. The literature does designate this bouquet as 
representing a non-adversarial and restorative approach to justice.
367
 A participant in one 
study remarks, ―In traditional Acholi culture, justice is done for ber bedo, to restore 
harmonious life”.368 This restorative character is explained by Mato Oput‘s emphasis on 
truth-telling, compensation and reconciliation and forgiveness.
369
  
 
All of the accounts of Mato Oput consulted highlight the importance of how the 
mechanism assists in truth-telling.
370
  Given that Mato Oput can only take place once 
confession and admission of guilt has already occurred, the truth that emerges through the 
ceremony is not so much that of factual truth, but may be better explained in terms of 
―social/dialogical‖ and ―healing/restorative‖ senses of truth.371 The truth that emerges in 
the Mato Oput ceremony is arrived at through discussion and interaction between the 
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parties. A mutually acceptable version of events is a necessary requirement before 
compensation can be discussed and reconciliation explored.
372
 And, the emphasis for the 
mechanism is more about repairing social harmony within the community than 
establishing individual innocence or guilt of the perpetrator. This phenomenon has 
linkages with Du Toit‘s notions of truth as acknowledgement and justice as recognition 
as features of the South African TRC. 
373
 
 
A further aspect of the restorative character of Mato Oput is the emphasis on 
compensation as oppose to punishment. According to a series of interviews and focus 
groups undertaken in 2008-2009 it was this aspect of material compensation that was ―the 
most elemental and ubiquitously discussed aspect of traditional justice‖.374  
 
The emphasis on reconciliation and forgiveness is also invoked to explain Mato Oput‘s 
restorative character. Truth-telling and compensation are precursors to a reconciliatory 
act of eating and drinking, which then signifies forgiveness. Reconciliation is understood 
as a way of ending cycles of violence, or according to an interviewee, ―Mato Oput is the 
only way to stop the escalating killing. It is not about revenge‖.375 Caution has been 
raised regarding the unquestioned link between reconciliation and restorative justice.
376
  
The association made in this case differs in that Mato Oput is viewed as a means to 
restoring relations, and in this way deemed as a mode of reconciliation. Mato Oput is not 
viewed as an end in and of itself. This opens the way for reconciliation to be understood 
as a possible outcome of restorative justice, but not as a given. Interestingly, this 
reconciliation is conceived in simple terms of sharing a celebratory meal together. This 
sharing then seems to entail forgiveness in the sense that the victim no longer holds the 
perpetrator ransom to the wrongdoing and relations are normalised between the parties.
377
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This restorative approach to justice that underpins Mato Oput is in turn premised on a 
notion of community that is very similar to what Archbishop Tutu terms ―ubuntu‖.378 A 
respondent in the 2005 Roco wat I Acoli study explained that ―In Acholi, one lives 
because of the other‖.379 The study further explains that for the Acholi,  
 
―one person‘s crime extends to the entire family, and the family of the injured 
party is likewise affected. Thus one person‘s crime causes a rift within the entire 
community that can only be resolved after establishing the truth, payment of 
compensation and followed by a series of rituals or ceremonies in order to 
reconcile ‗bitterness‘ and chase away ill will or spirits that threaten the unity of 
the clan‖.380 
 
This understanding of the effects of a crime are paralleled with the criminal justice 
understanding of a sociological approach to crime.  
 
On this reading Mato Oput carries four characteristics that account for it being classified 
as restorative. Mato Oput is restorative to the extent that it emphasizes truth-telling, 
compensation, reconciliation and forgiveness and a communal/sociological approach to 
wrongdoing.   
 
 
4.4 Relevance and Significance for Transitional Justice 
 
This discussion has touched on the complexity of adapting customary practices of 
―traditional justice‖ such as Gacaca and Mato Oput as mechanisms of transitional justice. 
In both the Rwandan and Northern Ugandan cases it must be acknowledged that the 
substance of the respective traditional justice mechanisms is contested and continually 
evolving. With this complexity in mind we have nonetheless sought to explore the 
Gacaca Courts and Mato Oput with a view to how and in what sense the literature has 
construed them as examples of restorative justice.   
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In the case of the Gacaca Courts the assessment is that while articulated in terms of 
fulfilling a restorative agenda, in practise the hearings are perhaps more accurately 
described as retributive.  The retributive factors relate to the adversarial nature of the 
hearings with accusations a common occurrence and concerns that social relations 
worsen following the hearings. The potentially restorative elements include the localised 
settings of the Courts, the fact that the judges are mostly from the community where the 
conflict occurred, all stakeholders are given an opportunity to speak and the alternative 
penalty of community service as oppose to punishment in prison.  
 
To the extent that Mato Oput forms part of a broader bouquet of traditional justice 
mechanisms it carries significant grassroots support and is widely regarded as a 
legitimate option for a transitional justice package. The discussion has shown that Mato 
Oput can be broadly classed as restorative in terms of an emphasis on truth-telling, 
compensation and reconciliation and forgiveness.  
 
As a traditional justice mechanism Mato Oput does raise some important flags in terms of 
its applicability to transitional justice.
381
 The peripheral role that women and youth play 
in the Mato Oput ceremony severely compromises its relevance to transitional justice. 
Similarly, the role and status of Elders in contemporary Ugandan society is reportedly in 
flux. This could pose problems for the future implementation of Mato Oput as part of a 
transitional justice process. And finally, as was the case with the Gacaca Courts, there are 
serious concerns regarding the relevance of traditional justice practices in tackling gross 
human rights violations.  
 
In spite of the above-mentioned reservations both Gacaca and Mato Oput display one of 
the key aspects identified in Chapter 1‘s transitional justice framework, namely that the 
transitional justice response is about a society judging itself.
382
  Accounts of both Gacaca 
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(―It is people who are to make it up with themselves‖383 ) and Mato Oput illustrate that 
the mechanisms enjoy widespread community support and legitimacy. Some accounts in 
the literature caution that this community legitimacy will be compromised by codifying 
and formalising ―traditional‖ justice mechanisms. The argument is that in order for 
traditional justice mechanisms to be effective they need to be independent from the state 
and function within the local community according to the accepted socio-cultural 
practices. However, for transitional justice mechanisms to be effective they ideally 
should have official standing and comply with international human rights standards and 
principles of due process, hence codification and formalisation enter the picture.  This 
tension is important and deserves serious attention. Could it be that assumptions about 
what transitional justice mechanisms ought to look like need to be challenged and 
scrutinised?  
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Conclusion 
 
This minor dissertation has attempted to do two things. Firstly, to try and clarify the 
concept of restorative justice by exploring three different sources of thinking on the topic; 
and then secondly to make some statements regarding the relevance and contribution of 
restorative justice to the field of transitional justice.  
 
On the first score our investigation into three different sources has shed some light on 
what is meant by the term restorative justice.  
 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu advances a conception of restorative justice that has its roots 
in his theology of reconciliation. Tutu‘s brand of restorative justice is such that justice is 
not an absolute principle on its own but rather a secondary value in relation to the 
overarching goal of reconciliation.  This reconciliation is possible only after there has 
been confession, forgiveness and restitution. In turn these three processes are assisted and 
made possible in community. ―Ubuntu‖ or human interconnectedness frames Tutu‘s 
conception of restorative justice in that it explains the harm that a wrongdoing causes, as 
well as provides the context for its resolution. For Tutu, all human beings are relational 
beings whose very essence is one of community.  
 
It follows that for Tutu, because of this interconnectedness, a crime or wrongdoing 
affects not only the victim and perpetrator, but the wider community too. This breach in 
human interconnectedness cannot be left to continue, and so must be resolved. The route 
to this resolution is through confession and remorse from the offender, which should be 
met with forgiveness from the victim, and then made good by restitution from the 
offender. For Tutu the greater the harm or wrongdoing, the greater the breach of human 
interconnectedness and hence the greater the need for reconciliation.  
 
This is why Tutu has called for reconciliation, which is for him the same as restorative 
justice, in contexts of gross human rights violations ranging from post-Apartheid South 
Africa to post-genocide Rwanda. Without reconciliation (restorative justice) the breach in 
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human connectedness will only worsen and lead to more harm. Tutu‘s conception of 
restorative justice was intact prior to the South African TRC, and was galvanised during 
the TRC process.  
 
There are significant parallels between Tutu‘s conception of restorative justice and what 
emerged through investigating Gacaca and Mato Oput.  While it cannot be said that there 
is one coherent conception of restorative justice emerging from African Traditional 
Justice Mechanisms, certain elements did emerge that are broadly classed as restorative. 
In these cases, as with Tutu justice is conceived in relational terms with social harmony 
and community as key priorities. Conflict and crimes therefore affect the wider 
community, and hence the resolution of conflict ought to include the wider community.  
 
The conceptions of restorative justice advanced by Archbishop Tutu and the African 
Traditional Justice Mechanisms (Gacaca and Mato Oput) share discernable points of 
overlap. Both advance conceptions of restorative justice that are grounded in community 
based understandings of human interaction. Tutu expresses this through his theology of 
ubuntu and this same sentiment is found in accounts of Acholi community codes, and to a 
lesser extent in the case of Gacaca. What follows is a relational or sociological approach 
to crime and wrongdoing. Tutu‘s three-tiered understanding of reconciliation involving 
confession, forgiveness and restitution is paralleled in the Mato Oput ceremony, and 
again to a lesser extent in Gacaca. These synergies suggest that restorative justice draws 
on and finds expression in what could be termed ‗religious‘ and ‗pre-modern/informal‘ 
conceptions of justice.  
 
This connection has been noted in criminal justice literature as was illustrated by the 
discussion in Chapter 3 of the development of restorative justice within the field of 
criminal justice. The fact that this insight has already been noted within the criminal 
justice literature, and not elsewhere speaks to a general lack of communication between 
the disciplines of criminal justice and transitional justice. This lack of communication is 
unfortunate as there have been significant developments within the criminal justice 
thinking on restorative justice that can enrich the transitional justice discussion.  
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Within the criminal justice thinking on restorative justice there are different approaches 
to restorative justice, and while these different approaches do not represent a coherent 
independent conceptual framework, there are nonetheless two key aspects that are worth 
noting. The two paramount lines of emphasis being that crime is approached as a 
violation of people and interpersonal relationships and that institutions and professionals 
cannot have the monopoly over the way in which crime is dealt with, rather all 
stakeholders need to be involved. The definition of crime as ―a violation of people and 
interpersonal relationships‖ as opposed to the legal construction of crime as a violation 
against the state is one of the defining restorative justice characteristics.
384
 It is from this 
view of crime as a violation of people and of relationships that the characteristic concern 
of restorative justice with the need to restore personal and social relations follows. It also 
follows that the restoration of personal and social harm necessarily needs to involve the 
victim, offender and community. And this in turn implies a ‗process‘ view of justice: 
what matters is not so much a ‗just‘ outcome but that all those affected by the crime are 
involved in the decision regarding the best way to repair the harm caused by the 
violation. And then secondly that the state, public institutions and professionals cannot 
have the monopoly over the way that crime is dealt with; victims, offenders and 
communities must play an active role in criminal justice. Of particular relevance here is 
Christie‘s point that if a society is deprived of their property rights to their conflict the 
society will lose out on opportunities for norm-clarification and deliberation over right 
and wrong.
385
  
 
On the second aim of this minor dissertation, the three sources of thinking on restorative 
justice touch on different elements of transitional justice as per the working framework 
developed in Chapter 1. The discussion in Chapter 1 set the scene for restorative justice 
by highlighting moments in the development of the field that point the way to a notion of 
justice that is not only retributive.   Significantly, Arthur notes that standard transitional 
justice mechanisms like ―prosecutions and vetting are unlikely to be adequate measures 
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in a post –conflict setting, where the problem of ex-combatant reintegration requires at 
least consideration of local-level restorative justice approaches‖.386 Similarly Luc Huyse 
suggests ―a move from a de facto dichotomy (impunity or trials) to multiple conceptions 
of justice and reconciliation – state and non-state instruments, legal, semi-judicial and 
non-judicial techniques‖.387   
 
Chapter 1‘s working transitional justice framework is primarily made up of Jon Elster‘s 
assertion that transitional justice is ultimately about a society judging itself.
388
 Or, as 
Zalaquett framed it, that the policy must represent the will of the people, without 
violating international law.
389
 We would like to suggest that this is probably the chief 
contribution of restorative justice to a transitional justice framework.  Elements of this 
contribution have been noted in the conceptions of restorative justice articulated in each 
of our chapters. Other points of contact relate to transitional justice as a response to the 
needs of different actors and the emphasis on acknowledgement and accountability. The 
over-arching contribution remains the extent to which the conceptions of restorative 
justice are able to engage with this important element of transitional justice.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned points of overlap and contribution, this study has also 
identified various key issues that require further attention regarding the relationship 
between restorative justice and transitional justice. A key recommendation is that if 
restorative justice is to be taken seriously within the field of transitional justice then 
attention must be directed to the rich body ever evolving work that is emerging from the 
field of criminal justice. Core debates on the nature of restorative justice are occurring 
within the criminal justice field, and this appears to be happening unbeknown to 
transitional justice. This can be remedied.  
Another potential issue that has been flagged as central to future discussions on the role 
of restorative justice within transitional justice is the connection between ‗restorative 
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justice‘ and ‗reconciliation‘. Crucial questions in this regard are whether ‗restorative 
justice‘ and ‗reconciliation‘ are regarded as synonymous or as distinct but 
complementary; whether there can be reconciliation without justice, or justice without 
reconciliation; and whether ‗restorative justice‘ ensures both reconciliation and justice?   
 
The connection between restorative justice and the South African TRC has led some 
scholars to equate reconciliation with restorative justice.
390
 Broadly speaking, 
reconciliation encapsulates a wide spectrum of initiatives, ranging from political 
coexistence and reparations to interpersonal healing and the promotion of civic trust. 
While it is plausible to argue for connections between the values of restorative justice, 
conditional amnesty and reconciliation, it is problematic and misguided to equate 
restorative justice with either amnesty or reconciliation.
391
 The TRC report advances this 
misguided approach by suggesting that a restorative understanding of justice allows for a 
coherent connection between amnesty and justice.
392
 The problem with this connection is 
that the report positions amnesty as a tool of restorative justice rather than as a 
consequence of the negotiated settlement. The conflation also extends to reconciliation 
being equated with the work of the TRC, whereas it is more accurate to note that 
reconciliation in South Africa did not begin with the TRC.
393
 By equating reconciliation 
with the TRC‘s work many assessments of the TRC confuse the TRC‘s legislative 
mandate. Moreover, the conflation with restorative justice and reconciliation stands in 
contrast with the criminal justice conceptions of restorative justice.  
 
Another issue that has been flagged concerns the extent to which restorative justice can 
make a meaningful contribution to transitional justice given that transitional justice is 
concerned with gross human rights violations of a mass scale. The model of restorative 
justice has mostly been associated with individual crimes where offenders have admitted 
                                                 
390
 See Lyn Graybill and Kimberly Lanegran ―Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa: Issues and 
Cases‖, African Studies Quarterly, 8/1 (Fall 2004): 1-18. www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i1a1.html. Also 
Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, Ronald Suresh Roberts, Reconciliation through Truth (Cape Town, 1996).  
391
 See Charles Villa-Vicencio, ―Restorative Justice‖ in Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader, eds., 
Pieces of the Puzzle – Keywords on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice (Cape Town: IJR, 2004), 33-8. 
392
 TRC Report, Vol 1, Par 55a, 117.  
393
 See Erik Doxtader 2009.  With Faith in the Works of Words: The Beginnings of Reconciliation in South 
Africa, 1985-1995. Cape Town: David Philip.  
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to the offence.
394
 Moreover, further reflection is required on how the kind of sociological 
or relational conception of crime advanced relates to matters of justice.  Violations of 
people and interpersonal relations could also be addressed and framed in terms of 
pathology and therapy for the harm caused or trauma suffered; this need not involve 
justice?  
 
This study commenced with a quote from Aristotle‘s Politics - ―For all men cling to 
justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the 
whole idea‖.395 This study has explored three dominant conceptions of restorative justice 
and while much clarity has been gained on these conceptions, this study concludes by 
affirming Aristotle‘s charge. The three conceptions of restorative justice under discussion 
do not, from a transitional justice perspective ―express the whole idea‖.  
 
It may be, however, that the very extent to which these various conceptions of restorative 
justice are not exhaustive accounts of transitional justice, is in fact their abiding 
contribution. It has been noted by various scholars that the kind of justice required for 
transitional justice contexts needs to remain an open question. Diane Orentlicher captures 
this well, ―Given the extraordinary range of national experiences and cultures, how could 
anyone imagine there to be a universally relevant formula for transitional justice?‖.396 
Similarly, Jon Elster suggests that while justice can be defined in intrinsic (deontological) 
or in instrumental (utilitarian) terms, this choice is not helpful. ―Full-blown non-
consequentialism – let justice be done even though the heavens might fall – is absurd. 
Full-blown consequentialism – such as allowing the killing of innocent individuals ―pour 
encourager les autres‖ – is no less absurd. Any reasonable policy must have both 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist components‖.397 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis Martha Minow was singled out for her contribution to the 
field. Minow‘s admission of ―the incompleteness and inescapable inadequacy of each 
                                                 
394
 Declan Roche, The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 2
nd
 series ―Restorative 
Justice‖, 57.   
395
 Aristotle, Politics, Book III Chapter 9, 1280. 
396
 Orentlicher 2007:18. 
397
 See Elster, ―Justice, truth, peace‖ p22 
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possible response to collective atrocities‖ is pertinent as we conclude our discussion of 
different conceptions of restorative justice.
398
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
398
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